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Miseyko: Does it SPARC Joy?

DOES IT SPARC JOY? CLEANING UP THE
SPAC SPACE
G. Max Miseyko 
For the last few years, the special purpose acquisition
company—SPAC—was one of the hottest investment trends on
Wall Street. In a SPAC, an investment vehicle with a limited
lifespan (usually two years), a sponsor raises money from
investors up front with the goal of finding a target company to
take public via a reverse merger with a publicly traded shell
company. Once touted as a democratized way to access public
markets that avoids the rigors associated with traditional
initial public offerings (IPOs), those characterizations came
under fire in 2021 as academics and regulators spotlighted the
hidden costs and misaligned incentives that the SPAC
structure precipitates. As a one-time deal that allows investors
to opt out of a proposed merger, the SPAC lacks the “reputation”
component that underpins private equity relationships by
constraining agency costs and opportunism.
Enter the special purpose acquisition rights company—the
SPARC—a reconceived SPAC model that would allow
investors to opt in when the sponsor identifies a good deal. This
Note highlights how the SPARC promises to reintegrate the
reputational component that the SPAC lacks by facilitating
repeat deals and reframing the sponsor-investor relationship as
a long-term one.
For the SPARC model to become a reality, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) needs only to pass a rule
proposed by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that would
enable SPARC sponsors to issue tradeable Subscription
Warrants before raising capital. Instead, the SEC issued a raft
of proposed rules intent on killing the SPAC, prompting the
NYSE to withdraw its proposal. This Note calls for the SEC to
scrap the bulk of its proposed SPAC rules in favor of a revised
rule allowing the issuance of Subscription Warrants for


J.D. Candidate, 2023, University of Georgia School of Law; B.A., 2011, University of
Florida. The author thanks Professor Usha Rodrigues for her insights, advice, and research
that made this Note possible.
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compensation that incorporate an oversubscription privilege to
match investor appetites with target company funding needs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many market commentators declared 2020 “the year of SPACs,”
but they were wrong—that honor goes to 2021.1 By 2021’s year-end,
the U.S. IPO market raised more than $315 billion, nearly doubling
2020’s record-total of $168.7 billion.2 And it was the special purpose
acquisition company (SPAC) that largely drove the growth, with
SPAC IPOs accounting for sixty percent of all U.S. IPO filings and
around fifty-one percent of all proceeds.3 Despite experiencing a
second quarter slowdown while investors digested the prospect of
increased regulatory scrutiny,4 the SPAC market eventually
resumed its torrid pace even as SEC staff informally signaled that
the Agency would propose new SPAC rules in the first quarter of
2022.5 After a meteoric rise to prominence that was unimaginable
pre-COVID,6 the SPAC threatened to dethrone the traditional
bookbuilding IPO method7 as the dominant method of public

1 Rubie Pearl Corales, Q1 2021 Global Capital Markets Activity: SPAC IPOs, Issuance in
Consumer
Discretionary
Sector
Surge,
S&P
GLOB.
(May
3,
2021),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/blog/q1-2021-global-capitalmarkets-activity-spac-ipos-issuance-in-consumer-discretionary-sector-surge.
2 Luisa Beltran, More Than 1,000 Companies Went Public in 2021, but Returns Are Worst
in a Decade, BARRON’S (Dec. 27, 2021), https://www.barrons.com/articles/companies-ipos2021-returns-worst-decade-51640294878.
3 Id.
4 See Statement of John Coates, Acting Director, Division of Corporate Finance & Paul
Munter, Acting Chief Accountant, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Staff Statement on Accounting
and Reporting Considerations for Warrants Issued by Special Purpose Acquisition
Companies (Apr. 12, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/accountingreporting-warrants-issued-spacs (issuing guidance indicating that SPACs should account for
warrants typically issued as part of the SPAC IPO process as liabilities rather than equity in
certain cases).
5 See Daniel Nussen & Elliott M. Smith, A Rollercoaster Year for SPACs, WHITE & CASE
(Mar. 30, 2022), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/global-ipos-blockbusteryear/rollercoaster-year-spacs (“It was noticeable that the fourth quarter of 2021 saw
something of an acceleration, with [SPACs] raising US$35 billion, up from . . . US$19 billion
in the third quarter.”).
6 See Alexander Osipovich, Blank-Check Boom Gets Boost from Coronavirus, WALL ST. J.
(July 13, 2020, 4:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blank-check-boom-gets-boost-fromcoronavirus-11594632601 (“[T]he coronavirus has fueled a fresh wave of interest in an
unusual investment vehicle with a shaky reputation: the [SPAC].”).
7 See infra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
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funding.8 That is, until the SEC issued the SPAC’s death warrant
in March 2022.9
A SPAC is a type of blank check company listed on an exchange
whose sole purpose is to acquire a target company seeking to become
publicly traded.10 When a SPAC buys a target firm and executes a
reverse merger,11 “the firm gets its spot on the exchange.”12 For the
target firm, merging with a SPAC “is a backdoor way of doing an
initial public offering.”13
Several factors have driven the SPAC’s recent popularity: the
influence of high-profile backers (called sponsors), “a better
understanding by the market of the SPAC structure, the wellestablished complementary private investment in the public equity
(PIPE) financing market,” and the SPAC model’s potential
attractiveness to companies wanting to go public while maximizing
marketability and retaining “more control over valuation and share
price” compared to a traditional IPO.14 But 2021 also exposed
8 See Stephen Guilfoyle, Why SPACs Won’t Replace Traditional IPOs—and Vice Versa,
THESTREET (Mar. 23, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/why-spacs-wontreplace-traditional-ipos (stating that SPACs have already replaced the traditional IPO to
some degree but noting that both methods will likely vie for dominance in different market
environments going forward).
9 See generally Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, Shell Companies, and Projections,
87 Fed. Reg. 29,458, 29,481 (proposed May 13, 2022) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229,
230, 232, 239, 240, 249, 270) [hereinafter SEC Proposed Rules] (proposing sweeping rules
that would substantively change how SPAC transactions are conducted); see also
Commissioner Hester M. Peirce, Damning and Deeming: Dissenting Statement on Shell
Companies,
Projections,
and
SPACs
Proposal,
SEC
(Mar.
30,
2022),
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/peirce-statement-spac-proposal-033022 (stating, as the
lone dissenter who voted against the SEC Proposed Rules, that “[t]he proposal—rather than
simply mandating sensible disclosures around SPACs and de-SPACs, something I would have
supported—seems designed to stop SPACs in their tracks” and that the proposal “imposes a
set of substantive burdens that seems designed to damn, diminish, and discourage SPACs
because we do not like them”); Eliot Brown (@eliotwb), TWITTER (Mar. 30, 2022, 1:28 PM),
https://twitter.com/eliotwb/status/1509221118917455881 (commenting about the SEC
Proposed Rules that “a lot of bankers think this will effectively kill the SPAC listing process
for startups, particularly for those with little or no revenue”).
10 See infra notes 51–53.
11 See infra note 41.
12 Osipovich, supra note 6.
13 Id.
14 Christopher M. Barlow, C. Michael Chitwood, Howard L. Ellin, P. Michelle Gasaway &
Gregg A. Noel, The Year of the SPAC, SKADDEN (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2021/01/2021-insights/corporate/the-year-ofthe-spac.
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fissures in the SPAC structure.15 Regulators focused on SPAC
warrant classification and Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA) disclosure issues.16 Increased redemptions drew attention
to structural flaws that tend to produce rampant shareholder
dilution.17 A lawsuit18 pitted prominent academics and a former
SEC Commissioner against the country’s biggest M&A players,
ultimately challenging the SPAC’s entire investment model.19
A reconceptualized SPAC—the special purpose acquisition rights
company (SPARC)—rose to meet those challenges.20 Conceived by
Pershing Square CEO Bill Ackman in response to a string of
challenges that ultimately derailed his record-setting $4 billion
Pershing Tontine (PSTH) SPAC,21 the SPARC promises to reinvent
the SPAC IPO process by eliminating the SPAC’s two-year time
limitation, replacing the SPAC’s opt-out with an investor opt-in, and
offering sponsors the ability to “chain” SPARC deals together.22 By
transforming the SPAC from a one-shot deal into a publicly traded
instrument of ongoing concern, the SPARC would revitalize the role
of reputation that constrains agency costs and curtails opportunism
in private equity relationships—constraints that the SPAC
desperately needs.23
To become a reality, the SPARC only required SEC approval of
an NYSE Proposed Rule that would have allowed sponsors to issue
tradable Subscription Warrants before raising any capital.24 That
once-expected approval never came, with the NYSE withdrawing its
proposal in light of the SEC’s decidedly anti-SPAC position.25 But
15 See Roger E. Barton, Caution Ahead: SPAC Litigation Trends Provide a Road Map for
Directors
and
Officers,
REUTERS
(Sept.
2,
2021,
12:38
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/caution-ahead-spac-litigation-trends-provideroad-map-directors-officers-2021-09-02/ (highlighting the uptick in SPAC-related litigation in
2021 that some attribute to the “SPAC structure [being] inherently conducive to litigation”).
16 See supra note 4; infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 127–137 and accompanying text.
18 Assad v. Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Ltd., 21-cv-06907 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 17,
2021).
19 See infra notes 165–175 and accompanying text.
20 See infra Section III.A.
21 See infra 150–177 and accompanying text.
22 See infra Section III.B.
23 See infra Section IV.A.
24 See infra notes 181–184 and accompanying text.
25 See Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Ltd., Current Report (Form 8-K) Ex. 99.1 (Apr.
28, 2022) (“In view of the [SEC]’s recently proposed rule changes and policy guidance with
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with the “ability for the approval of a revised rule” preserved, the
SPARC concept remains viable.26 Should the SEC eventually
change its stance on SPACs and choose to empower investors,
rather than paternalistically “damming up the SPAC river,”27 the
overwhelmingly positive comments to the NYSE Proposed Rule
indicate that investors would welcome the SPARC with open
arms.28
The SPARC’s promise cannot be grasped without first
understanding the SPAC’s shortcomings. Part II of this Note
situates the SPAC in today’s public funding market, explores its
relation to traditional IPO and private equity models, and raises
questions about its structural viability. Part III chronicles the rise
of the SPARC and examines how it could work in practice. Section
IV.A explains how the SPARC could revitalize the role of reputation,
enabling the SPARC model to succeed where the SPAC has failed.
Section IV.B presents unique structural benefits offered by the
SPARC. Section IV.C attempts to counter criticisms aimed at the
SPARC. Finally, Part V concludes by calling for the SEC to abandon
its SPAC rule proposal and instead approve a revised version of the
NYSE Proposed Rule that would make SPARCs a reality.

II. SPACGROUND
A. THE SPAC’S PLACE IN THE PUBLIC FUNDING MARKET

“Going public is the process of offering securities—generally
common stock—of a privately owned company for sale to the general

respect to [SPACs], we understand that the approval of the NYSE rule change as currently
proposed would not likely have occurred at this time.”); infra notes 183–184 and
accompanying text.
26 Id.
27 Peirce, supra note 9 (“It is not our place to decide that SPACs are good or bad.”).
28 See Comments on NYSE Rulemaking: Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change [Release
No. 34-92876; File No. SR-NYSE-2021-45], SEC, https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nyse2021-45/srnyse202145.htm (last updated Apr. 4, 2022) (drawing over 200 positive comments
urging the NYSE Proposed Rule’s adoption); cf. Comments on Special Purpose Acquisition
Companies, Shell Companies, and Projections [Release No. 33-11048; 34-94546; IC-34549;
File No. S7-13-22], SEC, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-22/s71322.htm (last updated
July 12, 2022) (registering eighty-five comments to the SEC’s proposed SPAC rules, an
overwhelming majority of which express concerns about the SEC’s proposal).
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public.”29 Typically, a private company issues its first shares of stock
for public sale through a conventional IPO.30 This process usually
entails hiring an underwriter31 (often an investment bank) to
develop a registration statement to file with the SEC, underwrite
certain risks, and coordinate special meetings with potential
investors called roadshows.32 The underwriter forms a syndicate of
investment banks to gin up interest from retail and institutional
investors, distribute a portion of the shares, and maintain investor
enthusiasm once the company’s shares begin to trade publicly.33
While retail investors34 are nominally able to partake in this
process, the typical high demand for shares of a new IPO—largely
due to the practice of underpricing35—incentivizes underwriters to
allocate the majority of shares to regular institutional customers.36

PWC DEALS, ROADMAP FOR AN IPO: A GUIDE TO GOING PUBLIC 3 (Nov. 2017) [hereinafter
ROADMAP FOR AN IPO], https://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/publications/assets/pwc-roadmapfor-an-ipo.pdf.
30 See EVA SU, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11655, SPAC IPO: BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES
2, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11655 (last updated Apr. 5, 2021) (“IPOs
are common methods for companies to raise funds and gain trading liquidity for their equity
stakes.”). The process described here is the bookbuilding method of distributing IPO shares,
the dominant method by which a company becomes public in the U.S. See Francesca Cornelli
& David Goldreich, Bookbuilding and Strategic Allocation, 56 J. FIN. 2337, 2337 (2001)
(noting that bookbuilding “has been standard practice for a number of years” in the U.S.).
31 See ROADMAP FOR AN IPO, supra note 29, at 42 (“Companies can go to market without
an underwriter, but the process is so complex and the know-how so specialized that it is rarely
done.”).
32 See id. (“The lead(s) or managing underwriter works with a company to develop the
registration statement, coordinate the roadshow, underwrite certain risks and form a
syndicate.”).
33 See id. (explaining that, as part of the syndicate, the selling group “solicits interest from
its retail and institutional clients, sells stock once an IPO goes effective and provides
aftermarket support”).
34 Retail investors are “non-professional market participants” who “purchase securities for
their own personal accounts and often trade in dramatically smaller amounts” than
institutional investors, who are “professional portfolio and fund managers who might manage
a mutual fund or pension fund.” Adam Hayes, Retail Investor, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 17, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/retailinvestor.asp.
35 See Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
711, 715 n.15, 724–25 (2005) (contending that while various rationales seek to explain
underpricing, i.e., “the fact that shares are priced less than the price the market would
sustain,” it is “often an intentional act designed to extract wealth for the few that receive
original IPO allocations”).
36 See id. at 712 (“[U]nderwriters allocated the majority of original IPO shares to regular
customers, mostly institutional investors . . . .”).
29
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As a result, retail investors are largely unable to purchase shares
until the original buyer resells them and the predictable retail
demand accompanying the first day of trading virtually guarantees
a profit for investors fortunate enough to buy original IPO shares at
the offering price.37 As IPO shares frequently fail to maintain the
retail-fueled price surges that characterize early trading, retail
investors who bought shares in the open market often get the short
end of the stick.38 The traditional IPO process “has revealed itself to
be undemocratic at best and manipulative at worst.”39
Alternatively, firms may access the external capital available in
public markets via non-traditional routes, “the most popular [being]
a reverse merger.”40 “A reverse merger is a transaction in which a
privately held company merges with a publicly held [entity].”41
While private companies occasionally take over smaller public
operating companies,42 most reverse mergers are “shell mergers”
involving publicly listed entities with little or no existing business
operations.43 These entities come in the form of “natural” shells
(“listed companies that have either gone bankrupt or sold a large
part of their assets”) or “cash” shells (companies created from
scratch for the sole purpose of acquiring a private company).44 The
private company becomes publicly listed upon merging, with
contemporaneous prearranged financing providing capital.45 A
reverse merger thus allows a private company to go public without

37 See id. at 712–13 (describing how this practice flourished during the 1999–2000 IPO
boom).
38 See id. at 713 (“Unfortunately, the majority of the shares issued in IPOs in the last few
years did not retain that initial profit, and the share price eventually plummeted, resulting
in a loss for the retail investor who purchased in the aftermarket.”).
39 Id. at 712.
40 Johannes Kolb & Tereza Tykvová, Going Public via Special Purpose Acquisition
Companies: Frogs Do Not Turn Into Princes, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 80, 80 (2016).
41 DAVID N. FELDMAN, REVERSE MERGERS: AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL
IPOS 24 (2d ed. 2009).
42 See id. at 25 (citing a widely publicized example of the NYSE’s merger with the much
smaller public Archipelago Holdings in 2006).
43 See id. at 24–25 (“[M]ost companies that go public through reverse mergers begin as
penny stock companies . . . .”).
44 Kolb & Tykvová, supra note 40, at 80.
45 See FELDMAN, supra note 41, at 24 (“Often financing arranged at the time of the merger
provides needed capital, just as with an IPO.”).
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incurring the costs associated with the traditional IPO process46 or
depending on timing the IPO market for success.47 Still, the reverse
merger is not without its downsides: not only are many existing
shells illiquid, but they also carry baggage associated with the lessthan-sparkling operating history that led to their shell status.48
Enter—or, really, reenter—the SPAC, one type of cash shell49
that has returned to the forefront of the public fundraising
landscape.50 A SPAC is a blank check company51 that “raises capital
through [an IPO] with the intention to use the proceeds to acquire
other companies at a later time,”52 usually within two years.53 “You
See id. at 28 (“A reverse merger usually costs significantly less than an IPO.”). The cost
of a traditional IPO can be substantial, both in terms of expense and time required. See
Considering
an
IPO?
First
Understand
the
Costs,
PWC,
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/deals/library/cost-of-an-ipo.html (last visited Aug. 28,
2022) (indicating that underwriting costs alone typically range from 3.5% to 7.0% of gross
IPO proceeds, depending on the total deal value). In addition, some consider “banks’
underpricing of traditional IPOs”—evidenced by the “so-called ‘IPO pop’”—an additional large
cost. Michael Klausner, Michael Ohlrogge & Emily Ruan, A Sober Look at SPACs, 39 YALE J.
ON REGUL. 228, 268 (2022) [hereinafter Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs].
47 See FELDMAN, supra note 41, at 31 (“Unlike IPOs, reverse mergers continue in all
markets.”).
48 See id. at 209 (noting that, unlike most shells, the SPAC has a relatively active trading
market and is “totally clean and not burdened . . . with a history from a prior operating
business”); see also ROADMAP FOR AN IPO, supra note 29, at 9 (highlighting the “[d]ifficulty in
finding the appropriate merger vehicle” as one disadvantage of the reverse merger route).
49 See FELDMAN, supra note 41, at 206 (clarifying that, while industry professionals
sometimes talk about SPACs and reverse mergers as if they are separate topics, a SPAC is
simply a special type of shell company and should be considered part of the reverse merger
landscape, not something separate from it).
50 See SU, supra note 30 (“SPACs first appeared in the 1980s but have gained popularity in
recent years, especially since 2020 during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic.”); see also Ivana Naumovska, The SPAC Bubble Is About to Burst, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Feb. 18, 2021), https://hbr.org/2021/02/the-spac-bubble-is-about-to-burst (recounting the
several waves of reverse mergers since the 1970s, with SPACs having surged to outnumber
IPOs at times during the mid-2000s “before falling off a cliff in 2011”); supra notes 3, 8 and
accompanying text.
51 A blank check company is a developmental stage company that “has indicated its
business plan is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified company or
companies, other entity, or person.” Blank Check Company, INVESTOR.GOV,
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/blank-checkcompany (last visited Aug. 27, 2022).
52 SU, supra note 30.
53 See Usha Rodrigues & Michael Stegemoller, Redeeming SPACs 9 (Univ. of Ga. Sch. of L.
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2021-09, 2021) [hereinafter Rodrigues & Stegemoller,
Redeeming SPACs] (“Initially, SPACs lasted two years; in our sample, the median SPAC
46
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can think of it like: an IPO is basically a company looking for money,
while a SPAC is money looking for a company.”54 When the money
finds a company, the SPAC’s key feature activates: shareholders
who like the proposed deal can hold their investment in the soon-tobe public company, while less optimistic investors have a preacquisition right to cash out.55
B. SPAC NUTS AND BOLTS

A SPAC comes into being when a sponsor—often a private equity
fund, although sponsors without any relevant investment
background have become increasingly common as celebrities ride
the recent wave of popularity to launch their own SPACs56—forms
a corporation and partners with an underwriter to organize an
IPO.57 “In its IPO, a SPAC sells units consisting of a share, a
warrant,58 and in some cases, a right to acquire a fraction of a share
at no cost when the merger closes.”59 The IPO proceeds are invested
in U.S. Treasury notes that are then held in trust with the
allows for 24 months for completion, although the mean—22 months—is somewhat lower
because a number of SPACs allow for only 18 months to close a deal.”).
54 Chris Metinko, SPAC vs Traditional IPO: Investors See Benefits of Blank-Check
Companies,
CRUNCHBASE
NEWS
(Dec.
3,
2020)
(quoting
Don
Butler),
https://news.crunchbase.com/news/spac-vs-traditional-ipo-investors-see-benefits-of-blankcheck-companies/; see also Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation:
The Evolution of SPACs, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 871 (2013) [hereinafter Rodrigues &
Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation] (“The SPAC investor is essentially buying a
management team.”).
55 See Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, supra note 46, at 237 (“A key feature of
SPACs is that, when the SPAC proposes a merger, shareholders have the right to redeem
their shares at a price equal to the $10.00 IPO price . . . plus interest . . . .”).
56 See Amrith Ramkumar, The Celebrities from Serena Williams to A-Rod Fueling the SPAC
Boom, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2021, 5:32 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-celebritiesfrom-serena-williams-to-a-rod-fueling-the-spac-boom-11615973578 (chronicling a lengthy list
of celebrity-backed SPACs, with endorsers including Shaquille O’Neal, Peyton Manning,
Steffi Graf, Jay-Z, and Paul Ryan).
57 See Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, supra note 46, at 236 (“The creation of a
SPAC begins with a sponsor forming a corporation and working with an underwriter to take
the SPAC public in an IPO.”).
58 “Warrants are like options, and they give the holder the right, but not the obligation, to
buy shares (or a fraction of a share) at a certain price (for SPACs, $11.50 per share).” Stephen
Deane, SPACs May Feed the Public’s Worst Fears About Wall Street, BARRON’S (Apr. 22, 2021,
7:00 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/spacs-may-feed-the-publics-worst-fears-aboutwall-street-51619034643.
59 Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, supra note 46, at 236.
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expectation that the trust assets will be used to acquire or merge
with a target company.60 At least eighty percent of the trust’s net
assets must go towards a merger.61 If and when a SPAC’s sponsor
finds an acquisition target, the “de-SPAC” process begins—
investors can “stay with the deal or redeem their SPAC common
stock for a pro rata share of the funds in [the trust].”62 “Importantly,
shareholders that redeem their shares keep the warrants and rights
that were in the units sold in the SPAC’s IPO. The warrants and
rights are used to attract IPO investors by compensating them for
parking their cash in the SPAC for two years.”63 Whereas SPACs
formerly gave stockholders a chance to vote both directly and
indirectly on the acquisition,64 a powerful form of “voice” not offered
under traditional private equity vehicles, those investor protections
have since largely gone the way of the dodo as deals proved too hard
to close.65 Nowadays, “[e]ven a SPAC with little cash remaining

60 See id. at 237 (“[C]ash in the trust can be used only to (a) acquire a company, (b)
contribute to the capital of the company formed by the SPAC’s merger, (c) distribute to
shareholders in liquidation if the SPAC fails to consummate a merger, or (d) redeem shares
. . . .”).
61 Lora Dimitrova, Perverse Incentives of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, the “Poor
Man’s Private Equity Funds,” 63 J. ACCT. & ECON. 99, 102 (2017).
62 SU, supra note 30.
63 Michael Klausner, Michael Ohlrogge & Emily Ruan, A Sober Look at SPACs 7 (Stan. L.
Sch. John M. Olin Program in L. and Econ., Working Paper No. 559, 2022) [hereinafter
Klausner
et
al.,
A
Sober
Look
at
SPACs
Working
Paper],
https://securities.stanford.edu/academic-articles/20201028-a-sober-look-at-spacs.pdf.
Following the de-SPAC, warrant holders “have a set period of time to exercise their warrants
and increase their holdings in the new company if certain conditions are met (e.g., share price
of at least $11.50).” Andrea Pawliczek, A. Nicole Skinner & Sarah L. C. Zechman, Signing
Blank Checks: The Roles of Reputation and Disclosure in the Face of Limited Information 10–
11 (unpublished study), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3933259.
64 See Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation, supra note 54, at 856, 906
(highlighting that shareholders once had both “a formal vote on a proposed acquisition and a
second de facto vote via the conversion threshold,” where SPAC investor redemptions that
exceeded a specified percentage (typically twenty percent in early SPACs) would prevent the
acquisition from proceeding).
65 See id. at 907 (“These powerful investor protections made the investment vehicle
attractive to initial investors, but turned out to make it much harder to get a deal done (i.e.,
to actually acquire a target).”). The development of different deal approval provisions
occurred largely in response to “hedge fund vote gaming and greenmailing,” id., whereby
large funds would require additional consideration in exchange for a “yes” vote, id. at 872.
Now, “sponsors of latter-day SPACs . . . denied their investors any approval vote at all—at
least as a matter of right.” Id. at 924.
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after redemptions can close a merger and bring a target company
public.”66
The sponsor’s compensation, known as the promote, takes the
form of a nominally-priced block of shares amounting to twenty-five
percent of the IPO proceeds.67 These shares are escrowed until a
deal goes through, at which point the “sponsors wind up owning
twenty percent of the post-acquisition company.”68 The sponsor will
also purchase “SPAC warrants, shares, or both at prices the sponsor
estimates to be their fair market value.”69 While the sponsor’s
investment “cover[s] the cost of the IPO and its operating expenses
while searching for a merger target,”70 equally important is the
“skin in the game” the investment represents—“requiring the
manager to invest his own money . . . aligns incentives by ensuring
that he internalizes some downside costs if the fund fails to
perform.”71 Should the SPAC fail to consummate a merger in time,
it “must liquidate and distribute the funds in the trust to its public
shareholders,” resulting in the sponsor losing its investment.72
C. SPACS VERSUS TRADITIONAL IPOS AND PRIVATE EQUITY

The SPAC shares similarities with both traditional IPOs and
traditional private equity.73 As with a traditional IPO, the SPAC is
a “public securities offering[] in which company ownership shares

66 Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, supra note 46, at 237. When expected
redemptions are high, SPACs can meet a target’s minimum cash requirement in other ways:
by securing additional investment by the sponsor or target shareholders, by making side
payments to “investors that commit not to redeem their shares,” or by attracting fresh “equity
infusions [in] the form of private investments in public equity, or ‘PIPEs.’” Id. at 237–38.
67 See id. at 236 (“Prior to the IPO, the sponsor acquires a block of shares at a nominal price
that will be adjusted to amount to 25% of IPO proceeds or, equivalently, 20% of post-IPO
equity.”).
68 Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation, supra note 54, at 871.
69 Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, supra note 46, at 236.
70 Id.
71 Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation, supra note 54, at 852–53 (noting
that SPACs mimicked this contractual feature of traditional private equity to alleviate
investor concerns given the potential for manager opportunism).
72 Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, supra note 46, at 237.
73 See SU, supra note 30 (“A SPAC IPO and a traditional IPO have similarities.”); Rodrigues
& Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation, supra note 54, at 851 (“[T]he creators of SPACs
attempted to translate key private equity features to the public markets . . . .”).
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are sold to the public for the first time.”74 “Both types of IPOs involve
underwriting and SEC registration and disclosure processes” and
result in a privately held company becoming a public one that trades
on a major stock exchange.75 SPACs too must file a prospectus (S-1)
with the SEC prior to the IPO.76 However, SPACs differ from
traditional IPOs in a number of important ways: SPAC investors do
not know the details of a future investment at the time of IPO,
“SPAC IPOs are faster and face less regulatory scrutiny,” and the
SPAC sponsor offers a fixed price for the target company’s equity
shares as opposed to a flexible, market demand-based price that
arises under the traditional IPO regime.77 SPACs do not depend on
the strength of the IPO market78 and may avoid underpricing issues
associated with traditional IPOs.79
Additionally, because the de-SPAC process is not itself an IPO,
“practitioners and commentors have claimed that an advantage of
SPACs over traditional IPOs is lesser securities law liability
exposure for targets and the public company itself.”80 This
perception relies on a reading of the PSLRA that suggests the
PSLRA’s safe harbor for forward-looking statements81 “applies in

SU, supra note 30.
Id.
76 See Pawliczek et al., supra note 63, at 2 (noting that the prospectus “can reduce
information asymmetry between managers and investors by shedding light on the firm’s prior
performance as well as assets and obligations,” but with substantially less information
available for a SPAC IPO, “the traditional IPO perspective on disclosure is less applicable”).
77 SU, supra note 30; see also Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Redeeming SPACs, supra note 53,
at 12 (“A SPAC goes through the traditional IPO process, but sidesteps many of the burdens
of the traditional IPO.”).
78 See FELDMAN, supra note 41, at 31 (“A SPAC’s IPO can take place even in a weak IPO
market because of many protections offered to investors purchasing equity in the SPAC.”).
79 See Carol Boyer & Glenn Baigent, SPACs as Alternative Investments: An Examination
of Performance and Factors That Drive Prices, 11 J. PRIV. EQUITY 8, 11 (2008) (“SPACs exhibit
much less underpricing than regular IPOs.”); Archishman Chakraborty, Simon Gervais &
Bilge Yilmaz, Security Design in Initial Public Offerings, 15 REV. FIN. 327, 328 (2011)
(positing that the SPAC’s unit offering structure, with warrants that are less sensitive to low
cash flow realizations, “can limit, and possibly even eliminate, the amount of money that new
issuers must leave on the table to ensure the success of their offering”).
80 John Coates, SPACs, IPOs and Liability Risk Under the Securities Laws, SEC (Apr. 8,
2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/spacs-ipos-liability-risk-under-securitieslaws.
81 The PSLRA’s safe harbor provision insulates issuers from liability for making forwardlooking statements that are “accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying
74
75
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the context of de-SPAC transactions but not in conventional
IPOs.”82 Safe from the threat of strict liability that accompanies
forward-looking statements made during the traditional IPO
process, dealmakers prize the “freedom to make forward
projections” that the SPAC offers.83
The relationship between SPACs and traditional private equity
is more nuanced.84 “Almost every SPAC feature borrows from the
playbook of the traditional private equity firm.”85 Like private
equity funds, SPAC sponsors ultimately must convince investors to
fork over funds “despite considerable information asymmetries (i.e.,
the managers know much more about the value of their talents and
the venture’s prospects for success than investors do) coupled with
the familiar risk of agency costs (i.e., the goals of self-interested
agents necessarily diverge from the interests of the principals they
represent).”86 Indeed, SPAC sponsors are “equivalent to specialized
private equity general partners (GPs) with deep pockets working as
ad-hoc underwriters.”87
But in actual private equity arrangements, where managers and
investors have long-term relationships in mind, reputation provides
a powerful constraint against opportunism.88 In a seminal article on
venture capital, Professor Ron Gilson identified that the fund
manager-portfolio
company
and
investor-fund
manager
important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the
forward-looking statement.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1).
82 Coates, supra note 80.
83 Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Redeeming SPACs, supra note 53, at 4 n.19, 50. While this
“freedom” is a draw for many SPAC players, others consider it a threat to investor protections.
See Chris Bryant, Why Chamath Palihapitiya Loves SPACs So Much, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 28,
2021, 1:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-01-28/why-chamathpalihapitiya-loves-spacs-so-much?sref=uC073IKU (arguing that “[i]nvestors shouldn’t rely
on the optimistic financial projections published by blank check companies” and that “[t]his
practice needs attention from the SEC”).
84 See Pawliczek et al., supra note 63, at 1–2 (noting that, while “SPACs are similar to
traditional private equity in many regards including investors providing up-front funding for
unknown, future investments[,]” “there are several key differences” ranging from greater
investor liquidity to “a larger incentive misalignment between investors and managers”).
85 Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation, supra note 54, at 851.
86 Id. at 852.
87 Minmo Gahng, Jay R. Ritter & Donghang Zhang, SPACs, (Oct. 10, 2022) (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 8) https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/SPACs.pdf.
88 See Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation, supra note 54, at 868 (“[T]he
long-term relationship between investor and manager comforts the entrepreneur who fears
opportunistic behavior from the [venture capital firm].”).
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relationships are structurally intertwined: “contracting problems
posed by extreme uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency
costs . . . [are moderated] through the braiding of the two
contracts.”89 Braiding describes the way that both relationships
“provide an implicit term that supports the other . . . thereby
increasing the contractual efficiency of both.”90 Scale and scope
economies,91 central to the private equity model, create “an
emphasis on reputation that has ripple effects for both targets and
fund investors.”92 “SPACs, in contrast, are one-shot deals” between
sponsors and largely anonymous public investors.93 Unable to
employ scale or scope economies, SPAC sponsors must instead rely
on managerial or operational expertise to differentiate
themselves.94 So while reputation influences the SPAC market to
some extent,95 given that repeat sponsors can tap into learning89 Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1091 (2003) (emphasis added).
90 Id. According to Professor Gilson’s braiding theory, fund managers recognize that
“behav[ing] opportunistically towards entrepreneurs in connection with previous portfolio
company investments” will sully their reputation in the eyes of other entrepreneurs seeking
investments. Id. at 1092. “[Losing] access to the best new investments . . . . will make raising
successor funds more difficult.” Id. The manager thus has a strong incentive to treat current
portfolio companies well because acting in the best interest of the portfolio company and the
investors (rather than maximizing the manager’s own interest in the present deal) “results
in higher returns to investors,” encouraging them to reinvest in the manager’s future deals.
Id. The fund manager-portfolio company and investor-fund manager relationships are thus
“braided”: reputation and behavior in one relationship influence and are influenced by the
other. See id. (“Again, the interaction between the two contracts supports the efficiency of
each.”).
91 “Scale economies exist if the unit cost of production and distribution of a product or
service declines as volume increases. . . . Scope economies exist if unit costs decline if multiple
products or services are produced simultaneously (for example, if more than one fund is
managed at a time).” William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital
Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 500 (1990). “Operating different funds within the same
family creates scope economies. . . . [M]anaging multiple funds takes advantage of any scale
or scope economies.” Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation, supra note 54, at
869.
92 Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation, supra note 54, at 868–69.
93 Id. at 901.
94 See Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Redeeming SPACs, supra note 53, at 12 (“SPACs seek to
differentiate themselves by managerial expertise, industries they will target, operational
expertise, and the like.”).
95 See Pawliczek et al., supra note 63, at 3 (“[I]nvestors may consider the reputation of the
sponsors in assessing the likelihood a SPAC will execute a profitable acquisition.”); Crystal
Kim, Serial SPAC Sponsors Hunt Bigger Game, Draw Greater Confidence, BLOOMBERG (Sept.
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curve effects,96 reputation’s structural absence from the SPAC
transaction limits the role it plays in constraining agency costs.97
Whereas SPAC participants once looked to “voice”98 to fill that role,
incentive structures and time constraints now largely bear that
burden.99
SPACs and traditional private equity models both employ
managerial incentive compensation structures, with the twenty
percent promote received by SPAC sponsors mirroring the twenty
percent carried interest common to both venture capital and
leveraged buyout fund managers.100 However, two key differences
21, 2021, 10:23 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-21/serial-spacsponsors-hunt-bigger-game-draw-greater-confidence (stating that “multi-generation SPACs
are the most sought after among investors because they are proven commodities” and
attributing the “relative bigness” of recent SPACs to “investor confidence in serial sponsors
such as [Chamath] Palihapitiya, Michael Klein, and Bill Foley”).
96 “Learning-curve effects exist if the unit cost of a process declines over time with
accumulated volume.” Sahlman, supra note 91, at 500. In the private equity context,
“venture-capital firms become repositories of useful institutional knowledge” and “benefit
from learning-curve effects as . . . . [t]hey cultivate a deal flow based on networks of contacts
and relationships,” thus developing “a reputation that has economic value.” Id.; cf. Chen Lin,
Fangzhou Lu, Roni Michaely & Shihua Qin, SPAC IPOs and Sponsor Network Centrality 3,
7
(June
8,
2021)
(unpublished
manuscript)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3856181 (finding that SPACs organized
by sponsors with high-quality networks “are associated with larger IPO proceeds, higher
M&A success probability, higher long-run stock return, and better operational performance,”
where SPAC sponsor network quality “takes time to build and assumes some trust and
recognition of success” to signal a sponsor’s “maturity and reputation in a more general
sense”).
97 See Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation, supra note 54, at 919 (“The
‘one-shot deal’ nature of the SPAC removed the reputation constraint on fund managers, and
the public nature of the markets eliminated the reputational constraint on investors.”); see
also Andrew Ross Sorkin, How to Fix SPACs: Keep Their Backers Locked in Longer, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/31/business/dealbook/spacsponsors.html (highlighting that even serial sponsors, like Palihapitiya, structure SPAC
deals that “suggest they don’t intend to be long-term investors,” allowing them to “exit long
before any of [the projections they make to attract investors] are ever realized or, in many
cases, missed”).
98 See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
99 See Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation, supra note 54, at 922, 924
(concluding that, “[w]hile [voting] rights may have seemed good in theory,” their rejection by
“a highly competitive market” evidenced their expendability in light of other SPAC features,
including “the short timeline” and the “80% in trust account requirement” that provides
investors a safe exit).
100 See id. at 892 (“As originally conceived, SPAC sponsors, like traditional private equity
managers, received around 20% of the venture’s profits.”).
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materially shift the resulting incentives. First, while private equity
managers receive the bulk of their compensation via carried
interest, they also receive salaries and management fees; SPAC
managers do not.101 Second, private equity managers only receive
their “Magic 20”—the typical promote—102 “upon realization of
profit (i.e. upon sale or IPO of that company),” whereas “SPAC
sponsors are rewarded for the mere fact of acquisition[,]” which
triggers the release of their shares from escrow.103 As a result, SPAC
sponsors are motivated “to pursue a business combination at all
costs.”104 Further, empirical evidence shows that this “at all costs”
mentality may be multiplicative when SPAC IPO underwriter fees
are only paid upon the successful completion of a merger.105
While SPACs and traditional private equity each have “a builtin fund life,”106 their terms differ dramatically: private equity funds
usually originate with a ten-year lifespan,107 while SPAC lifespans
are typically limited to two years.108 This disparity likely exists
because “the time limit constraint necessarily functions differently
in the SPAC, where ownership is liquid, than in the private venture
or buyout fund.”109 Whereas traditional private equity funds are
time constrained “both to discipline managers and to provide
liquidity,” the term limit on publicly traded (and thus fully liquid)
101 See id. at 893 (noting that, unlike private equity managers, SPAC managers “receive
nothing unless and until a deal is consummated”).
102 See supra note 67–68 and accompanying text.
103 Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation, supra note 54, at 893–94.
104 Id. at 892; see also SU, supra note 30 (“Some believe that because of the pressure to
construct a de-SPAC within a specified period of time, some SPAC sponsors, in order to book
the promote, may be more interested in getting any deal done (rather than getting a good
deal done).”); Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Redeeming SPACs, supra note 53, at 4 (“Every major
player in the SPAC is incentivized to find a target and take it public, even if it is a valuedestroying transaction.”).
105 See Dimitrova, supra note 61, at 100 (finding that SPACs perform worse when
underwriter fees are deferred and paid upon merger completion, “suggesting that
underwriters with an interest in a deal being completed, regardless of its quality, are more
likely to pitch bad deals to SPAC sponsors”).
106 Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation, supra note 54, at 898.
107 See id. (establishing that “[v]enture funds are usually ten years in length” with optional
annual extensions available for up for to three years and that “[p]rivate equity funds follow
this pattern”).
108 See Dimitrova, supra note 61, at 102 (“The founders normally have only 18 months from
the date of the IPO to make an acquisition, plus a six-month grace period if a deal is
announced but not completed by then.”).
109 Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation, supra note 54, at 899.
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SPAC shares serves only to “limit the amount of time managers
have the trust account at their disposal.”110 “Without [these limits],
investors might worry that managers will simply sit on the money
indefinitely; a limited lifespan thus increases the value of the trust
fund to investors.”111 Still, the ticking clock naturally creates
incentives—potentially perverse ones.112 Coupled with the
requirement that a SPAC sponsor use at least eighty percent of
assets on prospective deals,113 sponsors may not just rush deals but
also overpay for them.114
One perceived difference between SPACs and traditional private
equity is the SPAC’s accessibility to retail investors.115 Whereas
most private equity and venture capital funds “typically only allow
participation from individuals who are accredited investors,”116

Id. at 899–900.
Id. at 900.
112 See Dimitrova, supra note 61, at 113 (“Knowing that they have to close an acquisition
to collect their compensation, and being pressured under the two-year time constraints, SPAC
founders might be encouraged to make unsuitable acquisitions.”); William D. Cohan, SPACs
Are an Inside Joke on Wall Street, and the Joke Is on You, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 4, 2021),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90610373/spacs-are-an-inside-joke-on-wall-street-and-thejoke-is-on-you (“The ticking SPAC clock creates a number of perverse incentives, the worst of
which is that SPAC sponsors may end up competing for increasingly immature companies to
take public.”); cf. Ulf Axelson, Per Strömberg & Michael S. Weisbach, Why Are Buyouts
Levered? The Financial Structure of Private Equity Funds, 64 J. FIN. 1549, 1551 (2009)
(arguing that private equity general partners sitting on untapped funds towards the end of
the investment horizon are incentivized “to ‘go for broke’ and take bad deals”).
113 See supra text accompanying note 61. In some rare cases, SPACs may attempt to
simultaneously acquire multiple targets, but “the most common approach is the acquisition
of a single target.” Dimitrova, supra note 61 at 102.
114 See Dimitrova, supra note 61, at 113 (highlighting that sponsors may use the eighty
percent threshold “as an anchor in their decision when they evaluate potential target” or may
find it more convenient to overpay for a smaller target instead of bidding to acquire a large
target and risk diluting their ownership).
115 See Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 172, 227–28
(“[T]he SPAC phenomenon has been publicly attributed and promoted as a private equity
substitute, one the public can now freely access.”); Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Poor Man’s
Private Equity: Gambling on Unknown IPOs, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/business/worldbusiness/12iht-deal.1.9962658.html
(describing a SPAC as a “publicly traded buyout fund” where “Average Joes finally get access
to Masters of the Universe—at least that is the sales pitch”).
116 To qualify as an accredited investor, an individual must have “a net worth over $1
million or an individual income of $200,000 in the past year, with a reasonable expectation of
the same in the coming year.” Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation, supra
note 54, at 861.
110
111
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publicly traded SPACs invite investment by “non-accredited momand-pop investors.”117 Thus, SPACs have been billed as the “poor
man’s private equity”118—a way to democratize capitalism by
breaking the chokehold of the investment banks on the traditional
IPO.119 Indeed, references to SPACs as the “poor man’s private
equity funds” have proliferated,120 even as that characterization has
come under fire.121 But recent research paints a far less egalitarian
picture, revealing that large funds tend to dominate the preacquisition SPAC market and crowd out retail participation.122
Even the major exchanges have recognized that the SPAC’s
“intrinsic features . . . limit the number of retail investors interested
in the vehicle.”123 Regardless of the extent of retail participation at
the SPAC IPO stage, it is now clear that the majority of recent SPAC
IPO investors are not investing in SPACs as a form of private
equity.124 Investors who buy shares following a merger
announcement are simply “investing in the target company, just as
Id. at 861, 866, 870.
Id. at 874.
119 Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Redeeming SPACs, supra note 53, at 2 (“Proponents tout [the
SPAC’s] ability to allow early-stage companies to access the public capital markets while
simultaneously democratizing capitalism.”).
120 See Sorkin, supra note 115 (calling SPACs “the poor man’s private equity” first); Shuli
Ren, SPACs Are Hot Because They Are the “Poor Man’s Private Equity Funds,” BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 2, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-0302/why-spacs-are-so-popular-they-re-the-poor-man-s-private-equity-funds
(stating
that
“[t]hese ‘poor men,’” i.e., retail investors, “account for about 40% of SPAC trading on BofA
Securities Inc.’s trading platforms”).
121 See Deane, supra note 58 (noting that Professor Klausner and his co-authors’ finding—
that there is minimal overlap between a SPACs initial investors and those who stay invested
in the post-merger company—“in itself challenges the idea that SPACs are a poor man’s
private equity”).
122 See Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, supra note 46, at 241 (“Investors in SPAC
IPOs are almost entirely large institutional investment managers affiliated with hedge funds
. . . .”).
123 SEC Notice of Filing of NYSE Proposed Rule Change, Securities Act Release No. 82180,
82 Fed. Reg. 57,632, 57,633 (Dec. 6, 2017); accord Notice of Filing of NASDAQ Proposed Rule
Change, Securities Act Release No. 81816, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,269, 47,269 (Oct. 11, 2017)
(reporting substantially similar observations by the NASDAQ).
124 See Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, supra note 46, at 245 (“This pattern of IPO
investment and subsequent divestment, followed by the attraction of new equity investment
at the time of a merger shows that SPAC IPOs and SPAC mergers are essentially
independent of one another.”); Deane, supra note 58 (“[P]rivate equity investors typically
have five-to-seven-year holding periods, while recent history suggest SPACs are a trader’s
vehicle.”).
117
118
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any investor would invest in any other public company. The ‘private
equity’ element is no longer present.”125
It is the post-announcement, pre-merger investor—more likely to
be a retail participant at this stage126—who pays the substantial
hidden cost of the SPAC: dilution.127 This dilution flows from three
primary sources: the sponsor’s promote,128 underwriting costs,129
and the warrants retained by SPAC IPO investors who redeem their
shares pre-merger.130 While SPAC underwriting fees (“typically
5.5% of IPO proceeds”) are nominally lower than fees charged for a
traditional IPO of comparable size, they are not discounted for share
redemptions in any way.131 Share redemptions strip the merger
target of the very cash benefits the underwriting fees are charged
to provide.132 Accounting for redemptions, SPAC underwriting fees
can be comparatively high.133 But the real kicker comes from the
warrants retained by redeeming shareholders: for every share
redeemed, a warrant is effectively given out for free.134 While all
warrants are ultimately dilutive in the SPAC structure, it is the
redemptions that “amplify the effects of dilution” by leaving fewer

Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs Working Paper, supra note 63, at 18.
See SEC, INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE, DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INVESTOR
AS PURCHASER AND INVESTOR AS OWNER SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE SEC INVESTOR ADVISORY
COMMITTEE REGARDING SPECIAL PURPOSE ACQUISITION COMPANIES 4 (Aug. 26, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/draft-recommendation-ofthe-iap-and-iao-subcommittees-on-spacs-082621.pdf (noting that the SPAC market has
recently seen “[i]ncreased participation of retail investors prior to the de-SPAC transaction”).
127 Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, supra note 46, at 253 (“[N]onredeeming SPAC
shareholders tend[] to bear most of the cost [of dilution] embedded in SPACs.”).
128 See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
129 Underwriting costs include inducements in the form of “new private placement deals on
attractive terms, including discounted prices, side payments, or both” that SPACs often pay
to replenish the cash stripped by redemptions. Deane, supra note 58.
130 See Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, supra note 46, at 246–54 (describing and
quantifying these costs “extracted by parties other than the principals to the SPAC’s ultimate
investment transaction”—i.e., “the SPAC shareholders[] and the target and its
shareholders”—that “reduce the amount of net cash per share that a SPAC will contribute in
its merger”).
131 Id. at 250.
132 See id. at 250–51 (“[T]o the extent SPAC shares have been redeemed and the cash has
been returned, the underwriting fee represents depleted cash that has generated no benefit
for the post-merger company.”).
133 See id. at 250 (“For example, if 50% of a SPAC’s public shares are redeemed, the effective
fee is 11%.”).
134 See id. at 298. (“Warrants and rights are issued for free to IPO investors . . . .”).
125
126
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SPAC investors to bear the cost of the dilution “on a per-share
basis.”135 Given the extent of typical redemptions,136 the ultimate
costs of dilution borne by post-announcement, pre-merger investors
can be staggeringly high.137
We are left with a portrait of the modern SPAC that is messy at
best and possibly downright bleak—a far cry from the “pretty
picture” some SPAC participants paint.138 SPACs may grant faster
access to public markets139—or they may not.140 SPACs may offer
greater price and deal certainty compared to IPOs141—or they may
Id. at 232–33.
See Deane, supra note 58 (“The ‘Sober Look’ study [by Professor Klausner and his coauthors] . . . analyz[ing] all 47 SPACs with mergers from January 2019 to June 2020 . . .
found that a median of 73% of IPO proceeds were returned to investors who redeemed their
shares (but kept their warrants).”).
137 See id. (contrasting Professor Klausner and his co-authors’ study’s findings of an 11.6%
mean annualized return for redeeming IPO investors versus a negative thirty-five percent
twelve-month mean return for post-merger investors, significantly lagging the Russell 2000
and IPO Index benchmarks); Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, supra note 46, at 269
(“The median SPAC cost as a percent of cash delivered is 62%—more than twice as high as
the median IPO cost of 28%.”).
138 See The Art of the SPAC: From Sublime to Ridiculous, REUTERS (May 6, 2021, 9:45 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/art-spac-sublime-ridiculous-2021-05-06/ (“If beauty
is in the eye of the beholder, those with a hand in the SPAC market are seeing quite a pretty
picture.”).
139 See supra note 77 and accompanying text; FELDMAN, supra note 41, at 29 (explaining
that the reverse merger process “is much faster than a typical IPO, which usually takes nine
to twelve months from start to finish, and can easily take longer” because “they are
accomplished in fewer steps and with virtually no regulatory interference”).
140 See GERRY SPEDALE & ERIC PACIFICI, LAW360, 9 FACTORS TO EVALUATE WHEN
CONSIDERING A SPAC (Mar. 11, 2019, 2:13 PM), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/Spedale-Pacifici-9-Factors-To-Evaluate-When-Considering-ASPAC-Law360-03-11-2019.pdf (explaining that there is typically no significant timing
difference between a traditional IPO and a SPAC because, “[w]hile the IPO of a SPAC is
considerably faster than an operating company” due to minimal disclosures necessary, “the
acquisition by a SPAC of a target company takes a similar period of time as an IPO of the
same entity would”); see also Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, supra note 46, at 278
(“[I]f different types of firms are going public via SPACs versus IPOs, then differences in
speed may have more to do with the specifics of the firms rather than the SPAC versus IPO
process.”); Kolb & Tyková, supra note 40, at 93 (“[O]ur findings suggest that SPAC
acquisitions may take longer to execute than IPOs . . . .”).
141 See supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Redeeming
SPACs, supra note 53, at 15 (comparing the de-SPAC, where a signed merger agreement
assures the target it will go public at a specific price, versus traditional IPOs, where the
underwriting bank controls the process and may abort an IPO if doubts arise during the duediligence process, during the book-building and roadshow stage, or “through no fault of the
135
136
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not.142 SPACs may avoid underpricing issues143—or they may
simply obscure them.144 SPACs may offer promoters greater
regulatory freedom by allowing forward-looking projections that fall
under the PSLRA’s safe harbor provision145—but perhaps not for
much longer.146 SPACs may provide entrepreneurs a cheaper
alternative by which to take their company public than the
traditional IPO147—with any cost savings likely coming at the SPAC
investor’s expense.148 The only thing clear about the modern SPAC’s
value proposition is that it is unclear.149

company, the IPO ‘window’ closes (that is, if market conditions are judged not to be
receptive)”).
142 See Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, supra note 46, at 274–77 (finding claims
that SPACs deliver greater price and deal certainty compared to IPOs overstated); Matt
Levine, Opinion, Morgan Stanley Lost Some Hard Drives, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 20, 2022, 1:25
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-09-20/morgan-stanley-lost-somehard-drives (noting that “[w]ith SPACs . . . you get certainty of price but not of proceeds”
because “SPAC deals often involve very high redemption rates”; by contrast, “[i]f you do an
IPO you might get a worse price, but you have better odds of getting the money”).
143 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
144 See Matt Levine, Opinion, SPACs Aren’t Cheaper Than IPOs Yet, BLOOMBERG (July 27,
2020, 11:59 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-07-27/spacs-aren-tcheaper-than-ipos-yet (positing that after accounting for warrant dilution, “SPACs do not
avoid the underpricing effect of IPOs; they probably exacerbate it”); Gahng et al., supra note
87, at 7 (establishing that SPACs suffer from “the indirect costs of underpricing” just like
traditional IPOs do).
145 See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text
146 See SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 9, at 29,481–83, 29,567 (proposing a rule
eliminating PSLRA safe-harbor protections as they apply to the de-SPAC transaction and
substantially extending underwriter liability to cover any party who “takes steps to facilitate”
or “otherwise participates (directly or indirectly) in the de-SPAC transaction”).
147 See Kolb & Tykvová, supra note 40, at 83 (citing studies that show “reverse mergers
may offer the firm they acquire a faster public listing at lower costs than an IPO would” and
“that underpricing is substantially lower for reverse mergers than for IPOs”).
148 See supra notes 126–137 and accompanying text; see also Gahng et al., supra note 87,
at 8 (“[A] SPAC is substantially more expensive than pursuing a traditional IPO, both in
terms of the total cost as a fraction of the cash raised and as a fraction of the post-issuance
market capitalization.”).
149 See Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, supra note 46, at 274 (arguing that while
some SPAC-facilitated “price discovery mechanisms may be attractive,” alternative
structures could achieve those benefits “without the costs embedded in SPACs”).
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III. THE SPARC OF AN IDEA
A. SPARC IS BORN

Bill Ackman had a tough summer in 2021.150 A year earlier, in
July 2020, Ackman was riding high, having just raised $4 billion for
his PSTH SPAC—by far the largest SPAC in history.151 PSTH was
not your typical SPAC.152 Wholly foregoing the typical twenty
percent promote, Ackman’s hedge fund, Pershing Square Capital
Management (Pershing Square) invested $65 million153 in PSTH for
warrants that were twenty percent out of the money154 and not
saleable or exercisable for three years following a merger.155
Ackman essentially flipped the script: normally, it is the SPAC
shareholders who “do not receive any [compensation] until after the
company receives a 20% return,” but under PSTH’s “warrant-only
compensation structure,” it was Pershing Square who would receive
nothing until shareholders registered a twenty percent gain.156
Ackman’s next move was no more conventional. After nearly a
year of searching for a merger target, PSTH announced “a SPAC
deal like no other” in early June 2021: PSTH would put $4 billion
towards a ten percent stake in Universal Music Group (UMG), home
of artists like Taylor Swift, Ariana Grande, and Lady Gaga.157 Not
content with merely executing the largest SPAC merger ever,
Ackman’s deal was highly complex, with PSTH set to “fission into
150 See Out of Bill Ackman’s SPAC Woes Comes Innovation, ECONOMIST (Aug. 28, 2021),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/out-of-bill-ackmans-spac-woes-comesinnovation/21803915 (chronicling the “bevy of ghosts”—including regulators and litigious
shareholders—that chased Ackman following the proposed merger announced by his SPAC
in June 2021).
151 Id.
152 See Kenneth Squire, Bill Ackman and Tontine Holdings Rewrite the Terms for SPACs,
CNBC (Jul. 22, 2020, 7:05 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/22/bill-ackman-and-tontineholdings-rewrite-the-terms-for-spacs.html (“The structure of [PSTH] is unique on many
different levels.”).
153 Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Ltd., Current Report (Form 8-K) Ex. 4.3 at 2 (July
21, 2020).
154 Id. Ex. 4.3 at 5.
155 Id. Ex. 4.3 at 4.
156 Squire, supra note 152.
157 Andrew Ross Sorkin et al., Bill Ackman’s SPAC May Have Found a Dance Partner, N.Y.
TIMES (June 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/04/business/dealbook/ackman-spacuniversal.html.
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three SPAC-like things”: a distribution of Universal shares; the
creation of a new SPAC, dubbed Remainco, with the $1.5 billion of
remaining PSTH capital;158 and a warrant that would grant existing
investors rights to buy into yet another future deal.159 Perhaps the
most bizarre facet of the deal was that Vivendi, UMG’s parent
company, was in the process of spinning off the subsidiary later that
year, meaning Ackman planned to use SPAC capital to purchase a
company that was already going public on its own.160 Once-excited
investors161 were not enthused as PSTH shares plummeted on the
heels of the deal announcement.162 Nor was the SEC, who “privately
took issue with several elements of the proposed deal,” including
whether the transaction met NYSE SPAC rules, which Ackman
called “a deal killer.”163 In light of the regulatory concerns, Ackman
nixed the Universal proposal in a letter to shareholders on July 19,
2021, and pledged to return PSTH to the straight and narrow path
followed by a typical SPAC.164
But the dog days of summer were not yet over for Ackman—on
August 17, 2021, PSTH was hit with a lawsuit.165 Backed by Yale

158 Squire, supra note 152 (explaining that Pershing Square invested $1.5 billion in PSTH
upon formation, bringing its total capitalization to $5.5 billion).
159 Matt Levine, Opinion, SPACs Can Shoot Out SPARCs, BLOOMBERG (June 7, 2021, 12:44
PM)
[hereinafter
Levine,
SPACs
Can
Shoot
Out
SPARCs],
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-06-07/spacs-can-shoot-out-sparcs.
160 See Out of Bill Ackman’s SPAC Woes Comes Innovation, supra note 150 (“This was an
unusual use of SPAC capital: it would spend only some of the vehicle’s funds, and planned to
buy shares in a firm that was already going public.”).
161 See Klausner et al., A Sober Look at SPACs, supra note 46, at 53 (“Shortly after its IPO,
[PSTH]’s shares rose to about 15% above their IPO price and have remained there—
something exceptionally rare among other SPACs.”).
162 See Andrew Ross Sorkin et al., Bill Ackman’s Deal Machine Must Try Again, N.Y. TIMES
(July 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/business/dealbook/ackman-spacuniversal.html (noting that PSTH shares had lost nearly a fifth of their value since the deal
was announced, with Ackman commenting, “[w]e underestimated the reaction that some of
our shareholders would have to the transaction’s complexity and structure”).
163 Bill Ackman on Pulled SPAC: New SEC Concerns Killed Universal Music Deal, CNBC
(July 19, 2021, 8:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2021/07/19/bill-ackman-on-pulledspac-new-sec-concerns-killed-universal-music-deal.html.
164 See Letter from William A. Ackman, CEO, Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Ltd., to
Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Ltd. S’holders (July 19, 2021) (“In light of our recent
experience, our next business combination will be structured as a conventional SPAC
merger.”).
165 See Lauren Silva Laughlin, Bill Ackman’s SPAC Is a Treat That Is Going Moldy,
REUTERS (Aug. 19, 2021, 1:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/bill-ackmans-
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securities law Professor John Morley and former SEC
Commissioner Robert Jackson (now of New York University School
of Law)166, plaintiff George Assad claimed PSTH violated the
Investment Company Act of 1940167 (ICA) and the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940168 (IAA).169 Assad asserted that by “invest[ing]
all of its assets in securities of the United States government and
shares of money market mutual funds,” which was “all the Company
[had] ever done,” “PSTH is an investment company under the ICA
because its primary business is to invest in securities.”170 Professors
Morley and Jackson stated that the suit targeted PSTH because of
its “uniquely byzantine compensation structure” and “the striking
commonality between the SPAC and Ackman’s hedge fund business,
which is regulated as an investment company.”171 In reality, the suit
targeted the entire SPAC universe by implication given that the
alleged wrongful conduct (holding Treasuries from inception until
merger consummation) is standard industry practice.172 Had the
suit succeeded, SPACs would have likely had to register as
spac-is-treat-that-is-going-moldy-2021-08-19/ (reporting on the suit targeting PSTH for
“act[ing] like an investment vehicle rather than an acquisition company”).
166 On Jan. 16, 2020, Professor Jackson announced his resignation as SEC Commissioner
“on Feb. 14 to teach at New York University School of Law.” Paul Kiernan, SEC
Commissioner Jackson Resigns to Return to Law School Teaching Position, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
16, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-commissioner-jackson-resigns-toreturn-to-law-school-teaching-position-11579183208.
167 15 U.S.C. § 80a–1 to –64.
168 Id. § 80b–1 to –21.
169 See Laughlin, supra note 165 (identifying the parties behind the suit).
170 Complaint at 4, Assad v. Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Ltd., 21-cv-06907 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Aug. 17, 2021).
171 Breanna Bradham & Scott Deveau, Ackman SPAC Hit with Investor Suit Questioning
Its
Legality,
BLOOMBERG
(Aug.
17,
2021,
10:35
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-17/pershing-square-spac-hit-with-suitquestioning-its-legality?sref=1kJVNqnU.
172 See id. (“Usha Rodrigues, a professor of securities law at the University of Georgia,
called the lawsuit’s argument ‘bold’ and said it challenged the very model on which SPACs
are premised.”). Indeed, the major players in M&A took this lawsuit (along with two followup suits against three more conventional SPACs, E.Merge Technology Acquisition
Corporation. And GO Acquisition Corporation) as a challenge to the entire SPAC model, with
forty-nine BigLaw firms cosigning a joint statement rebutting the plaintiff’s proposed legal
theory. See Alison Frankel, 49 Firms in 72 Hours: How the SPAC Bar United Against Law
Profs’
Splashy
Lawsuits,
REUTERS
(Aug.
30,
2021,
4:30
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/49-firms-72-hours-how-spac-bar-united-againstlaw-profs-splashy-lawsuits-2021-08-30/ (detailing the “shockingly fast SPAC defense rally”
by the “SPAC bar”).
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investment funds—“[g]iven the resulting onerous disclosure
requirements and fee caps, this could [have] kill[ed] SPACs
altogether.”173 While Assad has since dropped the suit,174 the legal
attack on the SPAC structure presaged the SEC’s disclosure-related
rules proposal aimed at taking out the SPAC’s knees with a
different blunt instrument.175
At the very least, the lawsuit killed PSTH.176 But out of the ashes
jumped a SPARC.177 Ackman moved full speed ahead with the third

173 Out of Bill Ackman’s SPAC Woes Comes Innovation, supra note 150; see also Bradham
& Deveau, supra note 171 (quoting Professor Rodrigues as stating “[i]t could be a very big
deal, if the court accepts the arguments”).
174 See Elaine Briseño, Pershing Square Investor Drops Suit over SPAC Status, LAW360
(July 13, 2022, 2:38 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1511141 (reporting that Assad
agreed to dismiss the complaint on July 12, 2022, after PSTH decided to cease operations and
return investor capital).
175 See SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 9, at 29,573–74 (proposing rules that would create
a safe harbor that exempts SPACs that meet certain conditions from “be[ing] deemed to be
an investment company” under the 1940 Act); see also Peirce, supra note 9 (questioning
whether requiring SPACs to “adhere[] to the conditions of the safe harbor, some of which will
add expense or decrease the SPAC’s negotiating leverage and increase conflicts, [will] benefit
investors or harm them”); PAUL A. SWEGLE, COMMENT, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULES
REGARDING SPECIAL PURPOSE ACQUISITION COMPANIES, SHELL COMPANIES, AND
PROJECTIONS
4
(Apr.
9,
2022)
[hereinafter
Swegle
Comment],
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-22/s71322-20124063-280193.pdf
(“Contrary
to
statements suggesting that the SEC simply wants to level the playing field between
traditional IPOs and SPACs, the SEC’s proposed blunt instruments seem closer in design and
intent to the baton wielded by Tonya Harding’s crew against Nancy Kerrigan.”). Professors
Morley and Jackson continued their anti-SPAC crusade by submitting one of the lone
comments calling for the SEC to “promptly finalize the rule,” by adding that the SEC “should
further clarify that noncompliant SPACs are investment companies,” and by shaking their
fists at existing SPACs that have not complied with the not-yet-effective proposed safe harbor
conditions. ROBERT J. JACKSON, JR. & JOHN MORLEY, COMMENT, COMMENTS ON SPECIAL
PURPOSE ACQUISITION COMPANIES, SHELL COMPANIES, AND PROJECTIONS 1–2 (June 13,
2022), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-22/s71322-20131092-301127.pdf.
176 See Letter from William A. Ackman, CEO, Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Ltd., to
Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Ltd. Shareholders 1 (Aug. 19, 2021) [hereinafter Aug.
2021 Ackman Letter] (calling the lawsuit “meritless,” but admitting that “the nature of the
suit and our legal system make it unlikely that it can be resolved in the short term” and that
“our ability to complete a transaction in the required time frame has been impaired by the
lawsuit”); Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Ltd., Current Report (Form 8-K) Ex. 99.2 (July
11, 2022) (“[W]e are returning our $4 billion of capital in trust to shareholders as we have
been unable to consummate a transaction that both meets our investment criteria and is
executable.”).
177 See Aug. 2021 Ackman Letter, supra note 176 (“All is not lost, however . . . . [W]e have
been working on obtaining approval for the launch of Pershing Square SPARC Holdings, Ltd.
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part of his fission experiment,178 characterizing his proposed special
purpose acquisition rights company as “a modified opt-in (rather
than the current opt-out) SPAC structure where investors in PSTH
would receive long-dated, transferable SPARC warrants to acquire
common stock in SPARC[,]” which he expects to be traded on the
NYSE.179 “The SPARC warrants would not be exercisable, and
warrant holders would not need to invest their capital, until SPARC
has identified a merger target, completed due diligence, entered into
and approved a transaction, and cleared a registration statement
with the SEC . . . provid[ing] full disclosure . . . .”180 Ackman advised
that, because “current NYSE listing rules for warrants require that
the shares into which the warrants are exercisable be listed,”
issuance of SPARC warrants requires an SEC-approved NYSE rule
change.181 To that end, Ackman indicated he was working closely
with the NYSE, which had already drafted a new rule182 that
Ackman was confident would earn the SEC’s approval.183 On August
24, 2021, the NYSE filed the proposed rule change that would have
permitted the listing of Subscription Warrants with a ten-year
lifespan.184
(‘SPARC’).”). And despite the roadblocks that the SEC has put in his way in the interim,
“Ackman is still trying to launch his SPARC” having “filed a revised registration statement
with the SEC on June 16,” 2022. Michelle Celarier, Bill Ackman’s Long-Running SPAC
Drama Is Finally Over. Or Is It?, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (July 13, 2022),
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1ywsnp631118z/Bill-Ackman-s-LongRunning-SPAC-Drama-Is-Finally-Over-Or-Is-It.
178 See supra text accompanying note 159.
179 Aug. 2021 Ackman Letter, supra note 176.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 See Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Ltd., Current Report (Form 8-K) Ex. 99.1 (Aug.
24, 2021) (“[T]he NYSE has already drafted a new rule that if approved by the SEC would
allow the SPARC warrants to be listed on the Exchange.”).
183 See id. (“We believe that the investor-friendly features of SPARC should facilitate
SPARC’s approval within a reasonable time frame, that is in months, not years.”); Svea
Herbst-Bayliss, Ackman Seeks SPAC Relaunch to Fix Lawsuit’s “Harm,” REUTERS (Aug. 19,
2021, 11:08 PM), https://www.reuters.com/business/ackman-seeks-spac-relaunch-fixlawsuits-harm-2021-08-20/ (quoting Ackman about the SPARC’s approval: “I am confident
that we will get it done”).
184 Notice of Filing of NYSE Proposed Rule Change, Securities Act Release No. 9287686
Fed. Reg. 50,748, 50,748–49 (Sept. 10, 2021) [hereinafter NYSE Proposed Rule]. The proposed
rule defined a Subscription Warrant as “a warrant issued by a company organized solely for
the purpose of identifying an acquisition target and exercisable into the common stock of such
company upon entry into a binding agreement with respect to such acquisition.” Id. at 50,748.
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B. HOW SPARCS WOULD WORK

If an IPO is essentially a company looking for money, and a SPAC
is money looking for a company,185 then a SPARC is potential money
looking for a company.186 Rather than selling units in a SPAC IPO,
keeping the proceeds in trust, and requiring investors who
disapprove of a prospective deal to opt out via redemption, a SPARC
would gift subscribers the right to opt in to a future deal, holding no
shareholder money in the interim while the sponsor searches for an
acquisition target.187 A target company that inks a deal to go public
with a SPARC does not dive into a (potentially evaporative) pool of
cash but instead casts a vote of confidence in the sponsor’s ability to
quickly raise funds from SPARC warrant holders.188
As originally conceived, a SPARC would emit from a traditional
SPAC.189 Once a SPAC finds an acquisition target and goes through
the de-SPAC process, investors would not only receive shares of the
new public company but would also receive a Subscription Warrant
in a new SPARC venture.190 The SPARC, free of the SPAC’s two-

At the time of initial listing, Subscription Warrants would have been required to have an
aggregate exercise price of at least $250 million, of which, at least $200 million is accounted
for by a minimum of 1.1 million publicly held warrants by no less than 400 round lot holders.
Id. After the SEC designated a longer period for Commission action on the NYSE Proposed
Rule, solicited two rounds of comments, and extended the period for consideration to extend
until May 8, 2022—almost nine months after the original proposal—the NYSE withdrew the
proposed rule on April 26, 2022. Notice of Withdrawal of NYSE Proposed Rule, Securities Act
Release No. 94810, 87 Fed. Reg. 26,384, 26,384–85 (May. 4, 2022).
185 See supra text accompanying note 54.
186 See Matt Levine, Opinion, SPAC Suit Leads to SPARCs, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2021,
2:11
PM)
[hereinafter
Levine,
SPAC
Suit
Leads
to
SPARCs],
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-08-23/spac-suit-leads-to-sparcs (“A SPARC
is a SPAC without the pool of money.”).
187 See id. (contrasting the SPAC process where “shareholders put their money in up front”
with the “opt-in” SPARC process).
188 See id. (establishing that, for the target company, the SPARC “doesn’t come with any
guaranteed money,” but instead comes with “the sponsor’s ability to raise money, to go out to
the retail investors holding SPAC shares or SPARC rights and convince them to fund the
deal”).
189 See Aug. 2021 Ackman Letter, supra note 176, at 2 (“Originally, SPARC intended to
issue the SPARC warrants to PSTH shareholders after PSTH’s initial business
combination.”).
190 Under the proposed rule, the Subscription Warrant itself would not have come from the
SPAC or the newly public company, but it would have instead been issued by the SPARC, an
independent private company setup to issue Subscription Warrants and consummate an
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year time limitation, offers the freedom to find a new acquisition
target at the sponsor’s own pace.191 Once the SPARC finds a
prospective merger and enters a binding agreement with the
acquisition target,192 the Subscription Warrant’s exercise period
opens—investors who like the proposed merger can opt in (by
paying the warrant’s exercise price), while those who do not can opt
out (by selling the warrant in the open market).193 Once the SPARC
closes its deal, investors would receive a share in the SPARC-tomarket public company along with a new Subscription Warrant in
another SPARC.194 Thus, “the SPARC works as sort of a chainSPARCing mechanism: You raise a SPAC, and when the SPAC
terminates in a successful deal[,] you spin out a new SPARC; when
that terminates in a successful deal[,] it spins out another SPARC;
etc.”195 The sponsor’s current SPARC warrant, then, becomes a
proverbial membership card granting direct access to the SPARC
sponsor’s next deal as well as subsequent deals via future SPARC
warrant issuance.196
acquisition. See NYSE Proposed Rule, supra note 184, at 50,748 (“The issuer of the
Subscription Warrants must be a company formed solely for the purpose of issuing the
Subscription Warrants and consummating the acquisition of one or more operating
businesses . . . .”).
191 See Levine, SPAC Suit Leads to SPARCs, supra note 186 (noting that because the
SPARC structure would have “no time limits,” there would be an “emphasis on the sponsor’s
ability to do a good deal, sell the deal, and raise money”).
192 Ackman’s comment on the NYSE Proposed Rule described this process more fully: “Once
SPARC has identified a transaction, completed due diligence, negotiated the transaction
terms, signed a definitive agreement, and its independent directors have approved the
transaction, SPARC will file a post-effective amendment to its initial S-1 which will describe
the target company in detail, provide detailed risk factors, audited financial statements and
footnotes, MD&A, and all of the other disclosures that one would find in a traditional IPO
prospectus.” WILLIAM A. ACKMAN, COMMENT, PROPOSED RULE CHANGE PROPOSING TO ADOPT
LISTING STANDARDS FOR SUBSCRIPTION WARRANT 4 (Sept. 26, 2021) [hereinafter Ackman
Comment],
https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nyse-2021-45/srnyse202145-9287412259149.pdf.
193 See NYSE Proposed Rule, supra note 184, at 50,749 (“The Subscription Warrants may
not be fully exercisable . . . until after [the target acquisition] company enters into a binding
agreement with respect to the Acquisition and may not limit the ability of holders to exercise
such warrants in full prior to the closing of such Acquisition.”).
194 See Levine, SPACs Can Shoot Out SPARCs, supra note 159 (identifying that the SPARC
allows sponsors to “launch a new vehicle automatically and without having to raise money
for it up front”).
195 Id.
196 See id. (“[T]he SPARC spin could be an interesting variant, one that lets [SPAC
sponsors] launch a new vehicle automatically and without having to raise money for it up
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While Ackman’s prototype SPARC, Pershing Square SPARC
Holdings, would issue free Subscription Warrants to PSTH
holders,197 the Proposed Rule did not dictate that Subscription
Warrants must be distributed for no consideration.198 The Proposed
Rule recognized that the Subscription Warrants would have a
market value—in fact, they would have to maintain a minimum
value to remain listed.199 At a minimum, this price would reflect the
expected value added by a sponsor to the ensuing SPARC deal, but
with the “chain-SPARCing” approach in mind,200 it would also likely
include the residual value of potential future SPARC warrant rights
and deal values.201 The market price of the warrants, then, would
represent a pure bet on the sponsor’s future deal-making prowess.202
If “a SPAC investor is essentially buying a management team,”203 a
SPARC warrant purchaser is buying a direct securitization of that
manager’s ongoing ability to find underpriced companies and bring

front.”); Jacob Wolinsky, Odey’s Courtenay: The SPARC Conversion of Bill Ackman’s SPAC
Is
a
Wise
Move,
FORBES
(Dec.
16,
2021,
9:55
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobwolinsky/2021/12/16/odeys-courtenay-the-sparcconversion-of-bill-ackmans-spac-is-a-wise-move/?sh=23a83b811bcb (“[T]he benefit of the
SPARC structure is that [a sponsor] will ‘always have an evergreen entity that [the sponsor]
can use to complete a transaction.’”).
197 See Ackman Comment, supra note 192, at 4 (“[Pershing Square SPARC Holdings, Ltd.]
is distributing SPARC warrants for no consideration to PSTH shareholders . . . .”).
198 See NYSE Proposed Rule, supra note 184, at 50,749 (“The sale of the Subscription
Warrants and the issuance of the common stock of the issuer in exchange for the Subscription
Warrants must both be registered under the Securities Act [of 1933].” (emphasis added)).
199 See id. (establishing that the NYSE would suspend and delist Subscription Warrants if
total market capitalization fell below $15 million for thirty consecutive trading days, the
number of publicly held warrants decline below 100,000, or the number of public holders drop
below 100).
200 See supra text accompanying note 195.
201 See Levine, SPACs Can Shoot Out SPARCs, supra note 159 (positing that the SPARC
warrant’s market price would be linked to the sponsor’s “continuing interest in finding a deal”
or deals); Wolinsky, supra note 196 (explaining that Subscription Warrant valuation “must
include the valuation of a stream of successor warrants”). There will, of course, be cases where
the SPARC sponsor signals a clear intent to only do a single deal (e.g., when a corporate
sponsor issues a SPARC to spin off a subsidiary or bring a private partner company public),
in which case the residual value associated with potential future SPARC deals will be
minimal.
202 See Levine, SPACs Can Shoot Out SPARCs, supra note 159 (positing that the SPARC
warrants would trade on the stock market “as pure bets on your success as a SPAC sponsor
and your continuing interest in finding a deal[] (or deals)”).
203 Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation, supra note 54, at 871.
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them public. This securitization would allow the SPARC to succeed
where the SPAC has failed.

IV. ADOPTING THE SPARC
A. REINTEGRATING REPUTATION: THE ADVANTAGE OF THE SPARC
SERIES VS. THE LIMITED LIFESPAN SPAC

In Section II.C, this Note highlights the pivotal role reputation
plays constraining agency costs in the private equity context.204
With the SPAC, reputation’s role is limited.205 The SPARC promises
to reinstitute the role of reputation through the Subscription
Warrant’s market pricing mechanism, which effectively securitizes
the sponsor’s future deal-making abilities. Securitization would
essentially infix the sponsor’s reputation as a structural component
of the SPARC that beneficially guides the sponsor-target company
and sponsor-public investor relationships.
Section III.B establishes that the open market value of a SPARC
Subscription Warrant would be a sum of: (1) the expected value-add
by the sponsor to a forthcoming deal, and (2) any residual value
based on an expectation that the sponsor will issue more SPARC
warrants upon completion of that deal and future deals
thereafter.206 Investors receiving a SPARC warrant who had a good
experience with a sponsor’s previous deal and expect the sponsor to
add value to future deals will likely hold on to the warrant. If a
SPARC warrant holder’s experience with the sponsor’s prior deal
was unfavorable, or the investor does not think the sponsor’s future
deal prospects are strong, or the investor simply decides they do not
want to invest more capital in the type of company typically
involved in a reverse merger transaction, they may sell the warrant
to an investor who values the sponsor’s ongoing deal-making
capabilities more highly.207 The SPARC warrants thus end up in the
hands of those who are the most enthusiastic about a sponsor’s deal
prospects.
When the sponsor returns with a prospective target acquisition,
those enthusiastic warrant holders will already be predisposed to
See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
206 See supra notes 200–202 and accompanying text.
207 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
204
205

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol57/iss1/6

32

Miseyko: Does it SPARC Joy?

2022]

DOES IT SPARC JOY?

345

opt in to the deal. If some of those warrant holders determine that
they do not want to exercise once the binding agreement is
publicized, they will sell it to someone who likely will, either at a
lower price (if the market largely shares the investor’s negative
sentiments about the deal) or a higher price (if the market is
enthusiastic about the merger). Either way, if the deal is viable—
i.e., enough investors think the warrants would be worth exercising
at the exercise price to fund the deal—the warrants will trade hands
in the direction of investors ready to fund the deal. Only if a
proposed merger is so onerous that opting-in would generate an
expected loss exceeding the expected value of the sponsor’s future
SPARC deals would the price of the warrants trade towards zero
and scuttle the deal’s funding.208 Barring extraordinary
circumstances, so long as the sponsor maintains a positive
reputation for deal-making, the SPARC deal they bring to the table
will receive all the opt-ins necessary to fund it—without having to
offer dilutive warrants to attract investors.
Unlike the typical SPAC sponsor, the SPARC sponsor whose
ability to close deals relies on maintaining a positive reputation will
have substantially more agency-friendly incentives guiding their
decisions. While the Proposed Rule still mandated that any SPARC
acquisition involve “one or more operating business or assets with a
value . . . equal to at least 80% of the aggregate exercise price of the
Subscription Warrants,”209 that requirement would uncouple from
the time limit constraint imposed by the SPAC. This would free
SPARC sponsors from the SPAC’s ticking clock pressure that can
induce ill-suited acquisitions or bad deals resulting from a lack of
negotiating leverage.210 It would also mitigate the threat that a

For example, if investors expect that the proposed merger will only generate $8 per
share of post-merger value, the deal will still get funded at $10 per share so long as the
expected value of the sponsor’s future deals exceeds $2 (ignoring some premium that
investors would require to compensate for warrant delisting risk).
209 NYSE Proposed Rule, supra note 184 at 50,748. This Proposed Rule term is analogous
to the SPAC’s requirement that at least eighty percent of trust assets go towards a merger.
See supra note 61.
210 See supra note 112 and accompanying text; see also Ackman Comment, supra note 192,
at 5 (“[T]he [SPARC’s] 10-year term will effectively eliminate any perceived or real
negotiating leverage for a transaction counterparty compared with the two-year shot clock of
the typical SPAC.”).
208
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sponsor will overpay for a target company just to meet the eighty
percent threshold and consummate a deal in time.211
Helpfully, the direct relationship between a sponsor’s reputation
and their ability to close a deal greatly minimizes the impetus to
pursue a business combination at all costs.212 While SPARC
sponsors may very well still receive a promote like their SPAC
counterparts, the reward received for the mere fact of acquisition213
must be weighed against the prospect that an ill-suited acquisition
would negatively affect the market price of their SPARC
warrants.214 With that price bearing a direct relationship to the
SPARC sponsor’s ability to fund future deals, they could not act
opportunistically without jeopardizing their ability to field and close
those deals. Thus, reputation would constrain the SPARC sponsor
in much the same way as it constrains private equity managers.215
The sponsor’s SPARC warrant price, as a representation of their
ability to publicly fund a deal without having to seek alternative
capital sources, would also provide an important signal to the target
company. One of the SPAC’s perceived advantages over the
traditional IPO—one that may be more theoretical than material—
is greater price and deal certainty.216 By securitizing the sponsor’s
deal-making prospects, the SPARC could surely deliver that
advantage. As mentioned, a reputable sponsor with in-demand
SPARC warrants who brings a viable deal to the table should face
no issues garnering enough opt-ins to fund a deal. This remains true
even if the proposed deal fails to live up to the market’s expectations
because investors would fund even a negative-value deal if the value
of the SPARC warrant emitted from the deal (i.e., the expected
value of the sponsor’s future deal-making efforts) exceeds the loss
on the deal. Investors would still want to hold that sponsor’s
membership card217 so long as they can rationally view a less-thanstellar deal as atypical of that sponsor. With that in mind, a private
company negotiating a merger with a sponsor could simply look to
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
213 See supra text accompanying note 103.
214 Indeed, the sponsor must also pay greater consideration to the dilutive effect any
promote received will have on the deal’s success because that will directly affect the sponsor’s
future SPARC warrant price.
215 See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 141–142 and accompanying text.
217 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
211
212
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the sponsor’s current SPARC warrant price as a measure of that
sponsor’s reputation and ability to successfully fund a deal
completely with public money. All else being equal, a private firm
would thus be more willing to accept a deal at a lower valuation
from a highly reputable SPARC sponsor as the cost of ensuring the
deal gets full public funding. Or, if faced with similar offers from
multiple SPARC sponsors, the private firm would have a
substantial incentive to choose the one with the highest SPARC
warrant value.
A cycle thus emerges. With private firms more willing to make
good deals with SPARC sponsors with in-demand warrants, the
sponsor’s reputation directly impacts the sponsor’s ability to find
and deliver higher-value deals. The better the deals the SPARC
sponsor can negotiate because of their good reputation, the more
investors would be willing to pay for the sponsor’s current and
future SPARC warrants. The more investors would be willing to pay
for a sponsor’s SPARC warrants, the more likely it becomes that the
sponsor’s next deal would receive full public participation. The more
likely it is that a sponsor’s next deal would receive full public
participation, the more likely a merger target would be to make a
good deal with that sponsor. Hence, the securitization of a sponsor’s
reputation will reduce deal uncertainty for private companies,
internalize the cost of opportunism for the sponsor, and minimize
information asymmetries. This cycle closely resembles the
reputational braiding Professor Gilson observes in the venture
capital context218 as the sponsor-target company and investorsponsor relationships influence each other, thus increasing the
efficiency of both. The braiding effect could prove even more
beneficial in the SPARC context where an efficient market
quantifies the sponsor’s reputational value via publicly disclosed
price data.219
See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
This is not to say that the price of the sponsor’s SPARC warrants will efficiently value
the sponsor’s future dealmaking efforts. Given the nature of the sponsor’s work, not even the
most informed market participants can answer certain questions integral to the valuation
(for example, how long the sponsor plans to remain in the SPARC business). But with many
market participants trading a given SPARC warrant, the future value portion of the
warrant’s price would effectively trade like a prediction market. See Daniel E. O’Leary,
Prediction Markets as a Forecasting Tool, in 8 ADVANCES IN BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT
FORECASTING 169, 170 (Kenneth D. Lawrence ed., 2011) (“Prediction markets provide an
information gathering and aggregation mechanism across the population of traders to
218
219
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B. OTHER SPARC STRUCTURAL ADVANTAGES

The Proposed Rule’s terms would have offered SPARC sponsors
significantly more flexibility than a traditional SPAC provides. The
Proposed Rule did not require a pre-existing SPAC to issue a
SPARC; any reputable entity could set up a SPARC and issue
Subscription Warrants.220 The SPARC thus offers new avenues for
public companies to unlock shareholder value. For example,
consider a public company with a close relationship to some private
firm ready to go public. Tesla immediately jumps to mind given how
investors champ at the bit for the opportunity to fund Tesla CEO
Elon Musk’s other ventures.221 Musk could, in anticipation of taking
SpaceX public (or spinning off SpaceX’s subsidiary Starlink),222 set
up a SPARC and issue Subscription Warrants to Tesla
shareholders. Not only would Tesla shareholders receive either (1)
the opportunity to be an initial public investor in the next Musk
venture or (2) the proceeds from selling the warrant to someone who
wants that opportunity, they would further realize a bump to
Tesla’s share price from investors hoping for future Tesla-emitted
SPARCs. And Musk would efficiently spin off one of his private
ventures and place it directly into the hands of his already loyal

generate a price on some stock, where that stock being traded typically is a prediction or
forecast of some event.”). Substantial literature indicates that prediction markets provide
highly accurate forecasts even where substantial informational asymmetries exist while also
“increas[ing] the flow of information, encourag[ing] truth telling . . . and creating incentives
for agents to act in the interest of their principals.” Id. at 176–77. So, there is good reason to
believe that the public market can provide a more accurate assessment of a SPARC sponsor’s
reputation than the more insulated private equity world can for a given fund manager. Higher
quality information provides greater assurances for investors and target companies.
220 See supra note 190. The entity must be “reputable” inasmuch as its reputation with the
investing public must be positive enough that the Subscription Warrants it would issue would
meet the Proposed Rule’s $15 million minimum market capitalization listing requirement.
221 See Chris Katje, Could a SpaceX IPO Happen? Elon Musk’s Tweet Gets Investors Excited,
BENZINGA (Nov. 30, 2021, 11:45 AM), https://www.benzinga.com/news/21/11/24360198/coulda-spacex-ipo-happen-elon-musks-tweet-gets-investors-excited (“Fans of Musk and Tesla have
wanted to get in on a SpaceX or Starlink IPO for years.”).
222 Musk has stated that he plans to take Starlink public once the company’s revenue “is
reasonably predictable,” and that he “[w]ill do [his] best to give long-term Tesla shareholders
preference.” Elon Musk (@elonmusk), TWITTER (June 23, 2021, 9:44 PM),
https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1407877220543180800?s=20.
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base of shareholders while boosting the value of Tesla’s shares.
Everybody wins.223
Unlike the SPAC, where the public capital available for an
acquisition is fixed before the target search begins224 (thus requiring
a sponsor to turn to alternative sources for funding a larger-thanexpected deal), the SPARC could flexibly fund a deal of any size with
all public money. Because the Proposed Rule does not expressly
limit issuance of Subscription Warrants to a single series,225 a
SPARC could issue multiple series of Subscription Warrants to
match the funding needs of the acquisition target. For example, a
SPARC could issue Subscription Warrant series “A” to current
stakeholders (investors in a previous SPAC or SPARC) with an
aggregate exercise price of $500 million. Should the sponsor then
find an acquisition target seeking $1.5 billion in public capital, the
SPARC could then issue Subscription Warrant series “B” and “C,”
each with an aggregate exercise price of $500 million. The warrant
holders could exercise as many or as few of the three warrants as
they desire, selling any they do not intend to exercise to someone
who will. Not only has the SPARC sponsor given the preexisting
stakeholders three bites of the apple, but they have also increased
the public capital raise to match the acquisition target’s needs
without having to turn to private investors.
Alternatively, a modification to the Proposed Rule that would
allow for warrant holders to exercise an oversubscription
privilege226 would achieve the same goals more cleanly. Under this
approach, warrant holders would be given the option to
oversubscribe to a proposed deal—that is, to opt in to purchase
additional shares available once the first round of shares allocated

223 “Everybody,” that is, save for the favored institutional investors who would normally
receive allocations under the traditional IPO model. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying
text.
224 See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
225 See NYSE Proposed Rule, supra note 184, at 50,748–49 (allowing “a company organized
solely for the purpose of identifying an acquisition target” to issue Subscription Warrants
subject to minimum initial listing requirements with no restriction on subsequent issuance
prior to “enter[ing] into a binding agreement with respect to the [a]cquisition”).
226 See James Chen, Oversubscription Privilege, INVESTOPEDIA
(July 8, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/oversubscriptionprivilege.asp
(defining
an
oversubscription privilege as a privilege “extended to a company’s shareholders on the
issuance of a rights or warrants offering” that “allows shareholders to purchase any shares
remaining after other shareholders have had an opportunity to purchase them”).
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to the Subscription Warrants are accounted for.227 This approach
would avoid the potential administrative and regulatory headaches
that listing additional SPARC warrant series could create228 and
would promote SPARC warrant liquidity by focusing trading on a
single series of warrants.229 For these reasons, this Note argues that
the Proposed Rule should be revised to allow for an oversubscription
privilege as an efficient way for sponsors to match public investor
appetites with the target’s public funding needs.
Finally, the SPARC’s structure could provide a boon for private
equity. The finance world has long recognized the SPAC’s potential
to offer private equity or venture capital funds an expedient way to
cash out of their holdings.230 Private equity and venture capital fund
managers, however, have largely preferred traditional IPOs to
SPACs because the former allows them to “increase their
reputational capital in the new issue market” and reduce agency
costs.231 Given the SPARC’s promise to reintroduce reputational
factors and reduce agency costs in the reverse merger context,232 the
SPARC could yet make good on the SPAC’s promise as a private
equity divestiture vehicle. Private equity firms ready to take an
227 For proposed deals with a positive expected value, a rational warrant holder would
either always purchase the maximum number of shares available or sell the warrant to
another investor who would (as the right to purchase additional shares with an expected
value above the exercise price makes the warrant more valuable to the full exerciser).
228 Each series of warrants would have to meet the Proposed Rule’s $250 million aggregate
exercise price, 1.1 million in issuance, and 400 round lot holder requirements. See supra note
184. Each series would also be independently required to exceed the minimum thresholds
established to avoid suspension and delisting. See supra note 199.
229 The series approach to pairing warrant holder appetite with the merger company’s
public funding needs could produce additional information that the oversubscription
approach would not provide. By comparing the price of a series “A” Subscription Warrant (the
warrant series that encapsulates both the value of the present deal and the sponsor’s future
deal-making potential) with later series warrants issued to fund the present deal alone,
investors could deduce the market value of the sponsor’s future SPARC endeavors. However,
potential illiquidity for later series warrants could distort that information, and the value of
such information is likely minimal (beyond what it might provide arbitrageurs).
230 See Kolb & Tykvová, supra note 40, at 84 (contrasting how venture capital firms
typically keep most of their holdings during an IPO and lock up shares for a specified postIPO period to avoid sending negative signals about the value of a portfolio firm, whereas the
readily available liquidity offered by a SPAC acquisition allows for an immediate cash-out);
see also FELDMAN, supra note 41, at 239 (conceding that the author’s 2006 prediction that
private equity interest in reverse mergers would continue to grow had not materialized).
231 Kolb & Tykvová, supra note 40, at 82.
232 See supra Section III.A.
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investment public could distribute SPARC warrant rights to
existing investors as special dividends. Alternatively, the firms
could turn to some public entity sitting on extra cash and propose a
deal whereby the private equity firm issues SPARC warrants to the
public entity’s stockholders in exchange for funding the future
SPARC divestiture. The private equity firm retains full price control
as it efficiently brings the private investment public, while the
public company can offer its shareholders a dynamic dividend.233 In
sum, the SPARC structure could grant public investors the
opportunity to opt in to a private equity-nurtured IPO. The SPARC,
then, could come quite close to fulfilling the SPAC’s promise as the
“poor man’s private equity.”234
C. COUNTERING THE SPARC CRITICS

Critics may contend that the NYSE Proposed Rule enabling
SPARC Subscription Warrant issuance did not do enough to protect
the retail investor from many of the same practices that have
plagued the SPAC: the dilutive effect of the sponsor promote, 235
sponsor opportunism,236 and exploitation of the PSLRA’s safe
harbor provision.237 The SEC voiced its concerns in more general
terms, arguing that the Proposed Rule did “not explain how it would
effectively address the risk the price of subscription warrants could
be manipulated, or how its proposal otherwise would be designed to
prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices.”238 The
securitization of the SPARC sponsor’s reputation, however,
naturally limits the extent to which a sponsor can engage in these
practices. As Section IV.A explains, the threat that a SPARC
233 Assuming the aggregate value of the Subscription Warrants exceeds the investment
required to underwrite the SPARC merger, the company will have created shareholder value.
The private equity firm has the incentive to make this a positive expected value transaction
for the public company (by proposing the ensuing SPARC deal at a conservative valuation) to
maintain the private equity firm’s reputation for providing shareholder value for future deals.
Again, reputation constrains opportunism and agency costs.
234 See supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text. Of course, no public funding vehicle
could ever truly offer the private equity experience.
235 See supra notes 127, 130 and accompanying text.
236 See supra notes 104–105 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
238 SEC Order Instituting Proceedings to Determine Whether to Approve or Disapprove a
Proposed Rule Change, Securities Act Release No. 93741, 86 Fed. Reg. 71,111, 71,114 (Dec.
14, 2021) [hereinafter SEC Order].
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sponsor’s warrants will be delisted incentivizes the sponsor to
produce positive expected value deals for warrant holders.239
No, the Proposed Rule did not limit the sponsor’s ability to take
the SPAC’s traditional twenty percent promote as part of any
negotiated deal.240 Indeed, the SPARC sponsor could still have
issued themselves a hefty proportion of the SPARC Subscription
Warrants.241 But because the SPARC’s warrant pricing mechanism
would naturally constrain opportunism, the Proposed Rule did not
need to demarcate the limits of SPARC sponsor compensation to
retain investor protections. If the SPARC sponsor wants to dilute
the post-merger equity by taking a large promote or dilute their own
Subscription Warrant pool, they would do so at the expense of their
own reputational capital as embodied in the Warrant’s market
price. To the extent that the sponsor has earned enough
reputational capital to take blocks of stock or warrants without
risking their ability to secure future deal funding and can produce
a SPARC acquisition that provides positive value despite the
dilution, they should be free to compensate themselves accordingly.
Initial SEC pushback against the Proposed Rule focused on two
perceived investor risks: informational asymmetry—“how market
participants would effectively value this novel listed security”—and
sponsor opportunism—that Subscription Warrants would be
“susceptible to rumors about potential acquisition targets and
[transaction] terms” that “permit a bad actor to efficiently
manipulate these securities with little upfront cost.”242
Notwithstanding that these stated “grounds for disapproval under
consideration”243 are far more applicable to SPACs and the highly

See supra Section IV.A.
Ackman acknowledges that “[t]he massively dilutive nature of founder shares often
makes it difficult to complete a deal on attractive terms for [SPAC] shareholders,” and even
former SEC chairman Jay Clayton (who had taken a laissez-faire approach to SPAC
regulation) expressed concerns about the promote’s impact on ordinary investors. Ortenca
Aliaj, Sujeet Indap & Miles Kruppa, The SPAC Sponsor Bonanza, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 13,
2020), https://www.ft.com/content/9b481c63-f9b4-4226-a639-238f9fae4dfc.
241 Or, alternatively, a SPARC sponsor could potentially issue warrants for an exercise
price that is a fraction of the exercise price offered to public investors, so long as that exercise
price is at least $10. See NYSE Proposed Rule, supra note 184, at 50,748–49 (establishing $10
as the minimum issuance price).
242 SEC Order, supra note 238, at 71,113–14.
243 Id. at 71,112.
239
240
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volatile, often illiquid SPAC options244 that investors regularly
trade on the exchanges with the SEC’s blessing,245 securitization of
the SPARC sponsor’s future deal-making capabilities would
mitigate both risks. Even without hard data on “underlying assets
or business operations”246 for investors to use for valuation
purposes, extensive research on the efficacy of prediction markets
supports the idea that investors will be able to adequately price the
expected value of a sponsor’s future SPARC deals.247 Indeed, some
investors quickly provided value estimates of Pershing Square’s
SPARC using familiar financial modeling methods.248 And because
the expected value of the sponsor’s future deals represents a
material portion of the Subscription Warrant’s price, that price will
be less susceptible to influence from rumors relating to a single
forthcoming deal. Further, securitization of the sponsor’s reputation
incentivizes the sponsor to quash rumors and prevent manipulation
that would threaten to harm investors and, in turn, threaten to
harm the sponsor’s ongoing ability to find and fund quality deals.
Securitizing the SPARC sponsor’s reputation would not only
limit sponsor opportunism towards public investors but also
towards acquisition targets. The recent SPAC market frothiness
speaks to just how powerful the draw of an offer of a (seemingly)
guaranteed pile of cash can be for a private company, even one

244 See Brian O’Connell, SPACs Are Seeing More Volatility Tied to Gamma Squeezes,
THESTREET (Sept. 20, 2021, 4:44 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/spacs-are-seeingmore-volatility-tied-to-gamma-squeezes (drawing attention to the “very high risk” posed by
recent “[l]arge movements in SPACs” triggered by aggressive options traders targeting thinly
traded SPACs that now often experience “a very high amount of redemptions”).
245 See Michelle Celarier, Bill Ackman Gets More Pushback from the SEC, INSTITUTIONAL
INV. (Dec. 13, 2021) [hereinafter Celarier, Bill Ackman Gets More Pushback],
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1vw1rx6spnrtr/Bill-Ackman-Gets-MorePushback-From-the-SEC (“Of course, the same could be said about any of the hundreds of
SPACs in the market. Moreover, investors trade weekly options on SPACs, leading to losses
as SPACs have tanked this year.”).
246 SEC Order, supra note 238, at 71,113.
247 See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
248 See Wolinsky, supra note 196 (explaining how Odey Special Situations Fund manager
Adrian Courtenay arrived at a $13.82 SPARC warrant valuation by taking PSTH’s SPAC
warrant price, applying the Black-Scholes option-pricing model to account for the increased
time until expiration, and adding “the valuation of a stream of successor warrants” based on
“an assumption about the amount of time between each deal” of three years and a fifteen
percent “annual discount factor to represent the time value of money and the execution risk
of a multi-year series of [prospective] mergers”).
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poorly suited for public markets.249 SPARC sponsors, by contrast,
must be doubly sure the acquisition company is ready for the public
spotlight because their ability to guarantee that future deals receive
full funding depends on it. SPARC sponsors, then, will serve as the
first line of defense for investors rightfully concerned with the SPAC
market’s tendency to take companies public that would be better off
staying private.250 Yes, there will be fewer reverse merger deals, but
they will undoubtedly be higher quality ones nurtured by
accomplished sponsors.251 This is exactly what the SPAC market
needs right now.252
The SEC Proposed Rules aggressively target the long-standing
SPAC sponsor practice of making forward-looking statements to
public investors under the assumption that SPACs fall under the
PSLRA’s safe harbor provision.253 Having never addressed SPAC
safe-harbor applicability until the Agency abruptly expressed
misgivings in April 2021,254 the SEC’s proposal opted for the nuclear
option, seeking to completely eliminate the safe harbor by rewriting

See Rodrigues & Stegemoller, Redeeming SPACs, supra note 53, at 21–22 (identifying
that there is “little incentive for second-guessing the suitability of the private company for
the public markets”—“[i]ndeed, the less attractive targets are presumably most eager to close
a deal that will bring them liquidity,” so it is “[n]o wonder there have been some highly
publicized flameouts such as Nikola and Lordstown”).
250 See Luke Clancy, Refuge of “Chancers”: SPACs Draw Criticism from Big Investors,
RISK.NET (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.risk.net/investing/7816551/refuge-of-chancers-spacsdraw-criticism-from-big-investors (“Institutional investors are distrustful of [SPACs] which
they say encourage immature businesses to go public too soon . . . .”).
251 By concentrating viable reverse mergers in the hands of accomplished SPAC sponsors,
a greater proportion of such deals will benefit from learning-curve effects, further leveraging
the benefits of reputation. See supra note 96.
252 See Naumovska, supra note 50 (arguing that the same “institutionally driven dynamics”
that eventually led the last reverse merger wave to crash in 2011—“rapid proliferation of a
controversial financial innovation, plagued by poor-quality players, bad publicity and
regulatory concern”—have reemerged, threatening to burst the SPAC bubble).
253 See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
254
See Paul Swegle, Won’t SPAC Down, LEXBLOG (Mar. 14, 2022),
https://www.lexblog.com/2022/03/14/wont-spac-down/ (stating that, “[a]fter years of passivity
and regulatory neglect regarding SPACs,” the April accounting statement “exemplified the
SEC’s tendency to ‘lead from behind,’” and that the SEC’s “blunt force approach, presumably
well-meaning, was also disingenuous, poorly tailored to the situation, and extremely harmful”
as they used “a fake issue to kill the SPAC market”).
249
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the definition of blank check company to include SPACs.255
Asserting that there is “no reason to treat forward-looking
statements made in connection with de-SPAC transactions
differently” than those for traditional IPOs,256 the SEC would
presumably also seek to prohibit SPARC sponsors from making
forward-looking statements. But the SPARC’s ability to self-fund
based on the sponsor’s reputation would alleviate many of the SEC’s
PSLRA-related concerns. The reputable SPARC sponsor should not
need to employ overly ambitious forward-looking projections to
“help ‘sell’ the deal.”257 Questions about whether sponsors have
“sufficient incentives to do appropriate due diligence on the target
and its disclosures to public investors”258 are resolved when
reputation dictates that the SPARC sponsor must bring viable deals
to the table every time (or else jeopardize future deals). The SPARC
represents a safe-harbor happy medium that would allow the SEC
to continue letting early-stage companies publicly make projections
that their traditional IPO counterparts only make behind closed
doors,259 with SPARC sponsor reputational factors reining in the
prospects for abuse.

See Peirce, supra note 9 (characterizing the SEC’s move to change “the definition
Congress looked to when it wrote the PSLRA” as “a regulatory sleight of hand”: “Look over
there, Congress, while we rewrite the statute!”).
256 SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 9, at 29,482. A number of “SPACademics” and
numerous commenters to the SEC Proposed Rules recognize that there are indeed reasons to
allow safe harbor to SPACs and not traditional IPOs. See, e.g., Klausner et al., A Sober Look
at SPACs, supra note 46, at 284 (recognizing that “[f]or companies that face challenges
bridging information asymmetries with potential shareholders . . . providing projections and
other forward-looking statements may be an effective means of communicating value,”
especially where targets are “‘pre-revenue’ or low-revenue”).
257 Coates, supra note 80.
258 Id.
259 See Matt Levine, Opinion, The SEC Is Coming for SPACs, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 31, 2022,
1:23 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-03-31/the-sec-is-coming-forspacs#xj4y7vzkg (explaining that “companies that do IPOs make projections, and those
projections find their way to investors[, b]ut gingerly, carefully, and not in the official SEC
filings,” and that “[i]t is kind of nice that in SPACs the projections go into the public filing for
everyone to read, instead of being filtered through research analysts’ conversations with big
institutional investors—[i]n SPACs, everyone gets to read the same projections; in IPOs only
the institutional investors get them”); Swegle Comment, supra note 175, at 8 (commenting
that “the Projection Proposals create increased risks of the very types of ‘asymmetric
information’ flows they are purportedly designed to correct” by effectively shuttering deSPAC projections behind “closed-door roadshow presentations” like traditional IPOs).
255
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The SPARC consideration question looms: “Could you launch a
SPARC not with a free distribution to existing shareholders of
something (a SPAC, a SPARC, a public company), but with an
initial public offering of the rights for cash?”260 Understandably, the
thought of sponsors issuing securities backed by nothing but the
sponsor’s raw potential as a dealmaker strikes some as unseemly.261
But again, the reputation factor—the requirement that a SPARC
sponsor deliver value each time to ensure future deals get funded—
would serve as the natural regulator. Few potential SPARC
sponsors would have the clout to issue a paid SPARC offering out of
the gates. Those that do are unlikely to risk the very reputation that
would allow them to do so for a one-time payday.262 The SPARC
sponsor who sells warrants has a lot less leeway than the one who
gives them away for free. To the extent that a SPARC sponsor is
confident that they can deliver a future SPARC deal with value that
exceeds the cost of the deal to investors—a confidence investors
must share—they should be able to do so. As Ackman correctly
points out in his Proposed Rule comment, retail investors paying
premiums for SPARC warrants would be less exposed than those
who currently purchase SPAC shares at a premium to net asset
value: “SPARC warrants will have a much longer[ ]term than a
typical SPAC, [making them] inherently less speculative” and
simultaneously “much less capital intensive.”263 To that end, a
reformulated Proposed Rule should not incorporate limitations on
SPARC sponsor compensation, either directly via warrant issuance
or through some form of a promote.

V. CONCLUSION
Having reemerged as an attractive alternative to the traditional
IPO, the SPAC enjoyed a breathtaking increase in popularity in the
wake of the coronavirus pandemic.264 But with the brighter
spotlight came increased attention on the SPAC’s structural

Levine, SPACs Can Shoot Out SPARCs, supra note 159.
See id. (“[D]oing a paid SPARC offering would probably go a bit too far.”).
262 A SPARC sponsor who issued paid Subscription Warrants only to let them expire
worthless after a decade would not only lose all public investor trust but also would surely
find themselves defending a securities fraud class action to boot.
263 Ackman Comment, supra note 192, at 5.
264 See supra notes 6–8, 50 and accompanying text.
260
261

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol57/iss1/6

44

Miseyko: Does it SPARC Joy?

2022]

DOES IT SPARC JOY?

357

deficiencies. Academics, litigators, and regulators all took aim at the
SPAC market in 2021,265 revealing it to be overcluttered with bad
deals involving companies ill-suited for public markets, sponsors
driven by misaligned incentives, and retail investors left holding the
bag.266 This culminated with SEC Proposed Rules intent on killing
the SPAC in favor of the traditional IPO.267 The SPAC space needs
reorganization, not a complete teardown.268
The SPARC promises to remodel the SPAC structure to the
benefit of all involved. By eliminating the SPAC’s two-year time
limitation269 and the dilutive opt-out process, the SPARC realigns
sponsor incentives with investor aims.270 By securitizing the
sponsor’s future dealmaking efforts as a component of the
Subscription Warrant’s price, the SPARC reintegrates reputation
as a structural component that the limited lifespan SPAC
inherently lacks.271 By braiding reputation through the sponsortarget company and sponsor-investor relationships, the SPARC
promises to increase reverse merger efficiency by reducing deal
uncertainty for target companies, internalizing the cost of
opportunism for the sponsor, and minimizing information
asymmetries for investors.272 Last, by offering reputable sponsors
more flexibility than the SPAC structure can provide, the SPARC
would not only ensure that public money will meet target company
funding needs but also provide new avenues for both public
companies and private equity firms to unlock shareholder value.273

See supra notes 4, 83, 127–137, 165–173 and accompanying text.
See Cohan, supra note 112 (identifying that the financial press has picked up on “SPAC
excess as ‘rife with misaligned incentives between the sponsor and other investors’” that
causes sponsors to compete “for increasingly immature companies to take public” at the
expense of “unsophisticated investors”).
267 See Swegle Comment, supra note 175, at 4 (“[T]here seems to be a desire on the [SEC’s
part] to not only eliminate SPACs as a viable financing option, but also to possibly apply
certain of the proposed rules retroactively to punish SPAC industry participants for their
involvement in SEC-reviewed SPAC transactions.”).
268 See id. at 11 (“SPACs clearly have a role to play. Otherwise, they would not have eclipsed
traditional IPOs in 2021.”).
269 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
270 See supra Section IV.A.
271 See supra Section IV.A.
272 See supra Section IV.A.
273 See supra Section IV.B.
265
266
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To realize the SPARC’s promise to reorganize the SPAC space,
the SEC must scrap the bulk of its proposed SPAC rules274 and
instead lend its support to the NYSE Proposed Rule that would
allow SPARC sponsors to issue Subscription Warrants.275 This Note
calls for that course correction. Additionally, this Note recommends
amending the Proposed Rule to allow for an oversubscription
privilege as an optimal way for sponsors to match public investor
appetites with target company funding needs.276 With the SEC “in
the midst of a crackdown on SPACs”277 when the NYSE submitted
its Proposed Rule, the Agency’s reluctance to approve another
SPAC-like product came as no surprise. An “inevitable ‘blowout’”
loomed following a glut of SPACs sponsored by celebrities and
others with no clear business “advising SPACs or investing other
people’s money,”278 and the SEC’s concern with sponsor
opportunism is sensible. But the best way to rein in SPAC
sponsorship run amok is not by targeting de-SPAC projections and
sponsor promotes, but instead by refashioning the sponsor-investor
arrangement as a long-term relationship. By reframing the investor
question from “will this sponsor make me money on this trade?” to
“is this sponsor a worthy investment?,” the SPARC format would
only reward sponsors who deliver net value over the long run.
Securitizing sponsor reputation ultimately incorporates a marketbased form of management fee disclosure, giving “investors better
information about what they’re getting into.”279 This Note
recommends that a revised Proposed Rule should reject limitations
on the sponsor’s ability to earn a promote or receive consideration

Discussion of all aspects of the SEC Proposed Rules is beyond the scope of this Note.
The Author applauds the SEC for proposing enhanced disclosure related to, amongst other
things, “the nature and amount of compensation . . . and the extent to which this
compensation may result in material dilution” and compensation structures ripe for potential
conflicts of interest. SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 9, at 29,523. But beyond approving the
SPARC, the SEC could better serve investors by consistently employing existing enforcement
tools to reign in SPAC market excesses instead of entirely rewriting the rules governing
SPACs.
275 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
276 See supra Section IV.B.
277 Celarier, Bill Ackman Gets More Pushback, supra note 245.
278 Cohan, supra note 112.
279 Editorial Board, Opinion, Investors in SPACs Need to Know the Real Deal, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 11, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-02-11/investorsin-spacs-need-to-know-the-real-deal.
274
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for issuing Subscription Warrants. In other words: “Shed light, then
let the market decide.”280

280

Id.
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